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Abstract 
This thesis consists of two parts. Part A is about the Optimal Acceptance Solution 
for an Electricity Auction Problem while Part B is a study on the Plastics Industry in 
Hong Kong. 
In Part A, we use an example, Wisconsin Energies {WE Energies), to study the 
electricity auctions problem at the level of the energy distributor and the customer. 
WE Energies is one of the utilities which introduced electricity buy-back programs 
in order to better manage energy and cost during peak load periods. When the 
electric wholesale spot market prices spike to very high levels and the distributors 
(e.g. WE Energies) face an extra demand during peak time, they invite offers from 
the customers with certain bidding price associated with a certain amount of 
electricity. The problem for the distributor is how to choose among those offers. If 
choosing too few, he may lose the opportunity of selling to spot market at profit, but 
if accepting too many, he runs the risk of paying too much to customers while 
gaining little in the spot market. 
In Part A of this thesis, the objective is to maximize the total profit that the 
distributor can gain. The problem can be formulated as a general mixed integer-
programming model first and further modified into a problem resemblant to the 
knapsack model which in turn can be solved by pseudo-polynomial algorithms. We 
study both the deterministic and stochastic settings. 
In Part B, we provide an overview of Hong Kong's Plastics Industry. We use case 
study approach to conduct this study, which can be divided into two phases. The 
initial phase is the secondary data research. Following the extensive secondary data 
research, a comprehensive literature reviews on various issues of plastics is carried 
out. We can form an idea of the history and latest development of the plastics 
industry during this stage. The second phase of the study is in-depth understanding 
of a Hong Kong's plastics raw material company. We see the issues and challenge 
that the company faced. Three propositions are made to address the issues and 




Problem)的最優採納解答(Optimal Acceptance Solution)，而第二部分是香港塑 
膠業的硏究。 
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Chapter A1 
Introduction 
In part A of this thesis, we use an example, Wisconsin Energies (WE Energies), to 
introduce the electricity auctions problem at the level of the energy distributor and 
the customer. When the electric wholesale spot market prices spike to very high 
levels and the distributor (e.g. WE Energies) faces an extra demand during a peak 
time, it invites buy-back offers from his customers with certain bidding price 
associated with a certain amount of electricity. The problem for the distributor is 
how to choose among those offers. If choosing too few, he may lose the opportunity 
of selling to spot market at profit, but if accepting too many, he runs the risk of 
paying too much to customers while gaining little in the spot market. In our thesis, 
the main purpose is to find the optimal acceptance solutions for the energy 
distributor. We study both the deterministic and stochastic settings. 
Al.l Global Electricity Auction Market 
A 1.1.1 Background 
Electricity is a basic utility of daily life and economic activity. It usually cannot be 
stored economically. Recently, electricity markets around the world are undergoing a 
process of deregulation. For many years the power industry was conceived as a 
natural monopoly; however, as entry costs and economies of scale are being reduced 
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significantly because of new technology, efficiency calls for more competition (see 
Quintero [15]). 
The competition in the generation of electricity has been a key aspect of electricity 
industry reform and decentralization. Such competition has recently been occurring 
around the world. A central feature of decentralized electricity markets is the 
wholesale electricity spot market, or pool. 'Competitive' pools which we mean 
electricity spot markets in which generators compete to supply energy through their 
supply prices, have been introduced in a number of countries since 1990 and are in 
the process of being adopted elsewhere (see Fehr and Harbord [8]). The first 
competitive pool was introduced in England and Wales in 1990 whereas in 1991, it 
was created in Norway. Afterwards, the pools were set up in Australia, Chile, 
Argentina, Alberta of Canada and California of the United States respectively. 
Al.1.2 Mechanisms of Electricity Auctions 
There are many different types of auctions. For examples, pay-your bid, uniform-
price, single- or double-sided, open or sealed. Detail descriptions are attached in the 
Appendix A. Different places adopt different types of auctions, pricing rules and 
clearing mechanisms. We study a case of the Spanish Day Ahead Energy Market 
(Gomez and V^quez [9]) to better understand the trading mechanisms. 
According to [9], the bidding energy market is centrally managed system in which 
the market participants (supply and demand side) put forward bids to sell and buy 
energy. Two independent sub-markets form this market, the daily bidding market 
(day ahead) and the intra-daily bidding market. The market participants are 
producers (generation, co-generation, and renewable units), distribution companies 
(sell energy to regulated customers), suppliers (sell energy to qualified customers), 
qualified customers, and external agents (in neighboring system). The market 
operator is responsible for managing both bidding energy markets. It will match the 
selling and buying bids according to a specified matching algorithm. 
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In the daily market, every participant bid prices and quantities for the following 
day's 24 hours. The matching algorithm performs simple and independent generation 
and demand matches for each one of the 24 hours, resulting in hourly marginal 
prices and dispatch of load and generation. There are some extra conditions, such as: 
minimum value for cost recovery, ramp rate constraints, and minimum operating 
levels that are considered in the matching algorithm in order to get a feasible 
schedule for generators. The intra-daily market currently opens every hour. It is a 
market of deviations. In this market generation and demand deviation, bids are 
matched updating the schedule for all remaining matched hours of the daily market. 
Energy selling bids 
Generators can sell the energy in the centrally organized daily energy market or 
bilaterally by contracts. The market agents that want to sell the energy in the daily 
market must present selling bids. Each selling agent must present separate selling 
bids for each production unit. Each production unit will present selling bids for each 
one of the day-ahead 24 hours. The "simple" bid format consists of pair of values, 
quantities and prices. For the "complex" bid, the following conditions may be 
included in each production unit bid. 
1. The cheapest bid quantity can be designated as non-divisible. That is, in case 
that the designated bid is accepted, it should be for the total quantity and not for 
a fraction of it. 
2. A minimum daily income amount can be set as a pre-requisite for the 
scheduling of the considered production unit. The specified minimum income 
value must be lower than the income that would result by multiplying the 
specified quantities and prices in the "simple" format of the considered 
production unit's bid. 
3. Maximum variations of unit outputs in two consecutive hours can be specified. 
Thus, for the considered production unit, the energy scheduled by the matching 
algorithm in two consecutive hours must be met the condition of maximum 
variation specified as MW/min for increasing output and/or decreasing output. 
3 
Energy buying bids 
Demands can purchase the energy in the centrally organized daily energy market or 
bilaterally by contracts. The market agents that want to buy the energy in the daily 
market must present buying bids. Each buying agent must present separate bids for 
each demand unit. Demand unit is defined for a set of network connection points that 
supply the considered electricity demand. Each demand unit will present buying bids 
for each one of the day-ahead 24 hours. 
The matching algorithm 
For each hour, the market operator will build up the supply curve taking into account 
the selling bids for that hour ordered by increasing prices regardless the production 
unit that provided them. Meanwhile, the market operator will build up the demand 
curve taking into account the buying bids for that hour ordered by decreasing prices 
regardless the demand unit that provided them. Inelastic demand will precede buying 
bids with price values. 
In each hour, the supply and demand curves intersection point determines the selling 
and buying bids that are accepted, that is, generation and demand schedules. The 
hourly marginal price (market-clearing price) is obtained as the price of the last 
selling bid needed to meet the matched demand. Figure A 1.1 represents the matching 
algorithm for an hour. 
Figure A 1.1: Matching Algorithm for an hour 
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Al.1.3 Benefits of Electricity Auctions 
According to Dr. David Salant, NERA Senior Vice President (www,nera.com. a 
global Economic Consulting firm), auctions are a type of market. Without markets, 
energy would be allocated, as has been the case traditionally, by means of a 
regulatory process. A regulatory process is characterized by a regulatory agency or 
agencies determining who gets what energy and at what price. There is no room for 
competition. Without competition, the markets for energy and therefore the outcome 
are generally not as efficient as they could be because prices facing consumers do 
not always reflect the underlying costs. Too much or too little energy may be 
consumed and produced while the difference between price and cost will be purely 
the result of a regulatory decision and not of competition between firms. Well-
designed auctions, as an alternative to the regulatory process, can ensure a more 
efficient allocation of energy, and can therefore result in more favorable prices for 
consumers. 
A1.2 Electricity Buy-Back Program 
Al.2.1 Overview 
In this thesis, we do not investigate about the competitive electricity auction in the 
wholesale spot market, i.e. auction between generators and energy distributor. 
Instead, we use an example, WE Energies, to study electricity auctions problem 
between energy distributor and customers. 
WE Energies is the trade name of Wisconsin Electric Power Company and 
Wisconsin Gas Company, the principal utility subsidiaries of Wisconsin Energy 
Corporation in the USA. It serves more than one million electric customers and 
nearly one million natural gas customers in the State of Wisconsin and the Upper 
Peninsula of Michigan. WE Energies is also one of the utilities which introduced 
electricity buy-back programs. Before explaining this program, let me introduce 
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another one called "demand response program". We may say that "demand response 
program" is a more general term which is used by the energy management 
department of the government. It aims at providing incentives to curtail demand and 
reduce load during peak periods in response to system reliability or market 
conditions [19]. As of December 2002, more than 45 states in the USA have set up 
similar programs to better manage energy, costs and improve usage efficiency. 
Basically, an electricity buy-back program is a kind of demand response program. In 
more specific words, an electricity buy-back program is a voluntary, peak load 
reduction plan that offers financial rewards to customers that can reduce their power 
consumption during periods of high demand or high market prices in order to better 
manage energy and cost during peak load periods. 
We may know more about the background after reading the following article which 
is excerpted from the NY Times [21]: 
...when the temperature in Milwaukee hit an unseasonable 90 degrees, 
Wisconsin Electric saw a power shortage looming. One possibility was 
buying electricity from another company on the open market, but because 
other utilities were also caught short, that would have cost 10 to 20 times the 
usual price. 
Instead, the utility called one of its biggest customers, the Cleveland Cliffs 
iron ore mine, in Michigan's Upper Peninsula. How would the mine feel, 
dispatchers asked, about taking the afternoon off — and being paid for it? 
At first the answer was no. But then plant managers looked at the pile of 
crushed ore coming out of the milling machines, and realized that if the 
machines shut down for the rest of the day, no shipments would be delayed. 
After some quick negotiations, a deal was struck: ...(Wisconsin Electric) 
would be paying Cleveland Cliffs about 30 cents a kilowatt-hour not to use 
electricity, or about six times what Wisconsin Electric charges industrial 
customers for a kilowatt hour. But it was cheaper than buying power on the 
open market. 
Wisconsin has gotten more sophisticated since May, gathering the beeper 
and fax numbers of 80 of its biggest customers. On hot afternoons, it can 
alert them to log on to its Web page, where it offers them cash — the amount 
varies, much like the price of a restaurant's lobster special — to reduce 
consumption at certain hours. 
There are no statistics on the number of utilities using new methods to 
manage energy demand, but more and more companies seem to be doing it... 
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WE Energies, website [23] reveals that there are several energy buy-back programs 
designed to pay participating customers a market-based premium for voluntarily 
reducing their energy use when electric wholesale spot market prices spike to very 
high levels. It is targeting its large commercial and industrial customers. Two major 
buy-back programs are called Power Market Incentive (PMI) and Dollar for Power 
(DFP). 
A 1.2.2 Power Market Incentive (PMI) Program 
In PMI program, there is a contract between a customer and with WE Energies 
which lasts for one calendar year. However, even with a contract in place, the 
customer is under no obligation to accept any buy-back offers during the year. Per 
kWh offer prices are based on the hourly regional market prices of energy available 
to WE Energies. For each offer a customer accepts and WE Energies confirms 
through the PMI website, the customer will receive a credit on his account for his 
committed kWh reduction. For example, if he enroll 500 kW at a bid price of 
US$1.00/kWh and participate for 8 hours during a buy-back period, his credit will 
be: 
500 Wx$1.00/ / :W/ ix8 hours = $4,000. 
Up to this point, we may want to know how WE Energies measures the load 
reduction. Actually, for each customer who enrolls, a reference load curve will be 
prepared based on usage data from previous high-demand days. This existing load 
data can help customers determine load reduction needed for activation periods as 
well. The demand meters then measure the exact usage at any given point in time. 
Customers will be compensated (bill credit) on the next billing cycle according to the 
load reduction and the bid price. 
There are two kinds of offers under the PMI program. One is Day-Ahead Buy-Back 
Offers and the other one is Same-Day Buy-Back Offers. For the former, WE 
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Energies notifies participating customers by no later than noon of the previous 
business day that it is willing to buy-back power on the next day. These day-ahead 
offers are posted on the PMI website, specifying the unit kWh price, how many 
kWhs WE Energies is seeking in total, and the start and the end times of the 
reduction period. If the customer accepts a day-ahead offer, he needs to confirm 
within one hour of the notification and informs WE Energies how much power he 
will sell back for the entire reduction period. Same-Day Buy-Back Offers works like 
Day-Ahead Buy-Back Offers except that the whole process, i.e., notifications by 
PMI and the power buy-back from the participating customers, are done within the 
same day instead of a day earlier. 
Al.2.3 Dollar for Power (DFP) Program 
Under the DFP program, the customer chooses in advance the pre-established 
payback price for per kWh saving. As of October 2002, there are three prices offered 
to the customers. They are 40这，800 and $1.25 per kWh respectively. If a customer 
enrolled 500 kW at a bid price of US$0.80 / kWh and participate for 8 hours during 
the program activation period, his credit will be: 
500 kW X $0.80 /kWlixS hours = $3,200. 
The program is designated for medium size customers. It works like PMI too except 
that the compensation is not up to market under DFP. Instead, the payback price is 
pre-established, i.e., the participating customer chose the buy-back price when 
enrolling the program. 
In either program, WE Energies may decline the customer's response depending on 
amount of target load reduction and committed load reduction. Moreover, if the 
customer does not meet his load reduction commitment, he will be charged 
according to the spot-market price, which can be extremely high. On the other hand, 
if it makes sense from a cost-savings standpoint, WE Energies may re-sell power 
which is bought from the customer on the spot market at a profit. 
8 
Al.2.4 Why Buy-Back Programs were Introduced 
A buy-back program can benefit three parties: customer, energy distributor (i.e. WE 
Energies) and the market, which in turn make a win-win situation. Firstly, 
participating customer not only has a credit reward but also reduces his operating 
costs or utility costs. Whereas the energy distributor can avoid purchase of electricity 
at a very high price during peak load periods and meanwhile, he can gain from the 
re-sale of the buy-back power on the spot market. Lastly, according to the basic 
macroeconomic theory of demand and supply, due to the reduction in demand for 
electricity, there is also a reduction in wholesale power prices. 
A 1.3 Motivation 
When the distributor (e.g. WE Energies) faces an extra demand during peak time, he 
activates the buy-back program and notifies participating customers the details 
including bidding prices and amount of energy by pager and e-mail. Then, customers 
inform and confirm the distributor how much power they will sell back. The problem 
for the distributor is how to choose among those offers. We can demonstrate that this 
problem is similar to a simple knapsack problem. When extra demand Q and market 
price Pn are randomized (say, within a certain range), the problem becomes more 
complicated. It is interesting to get the optimal acceptance solution for the 
distributor. 
In this thesis, we modify a little bit about the mechanism of the electricity buy-back 
program introduced by WE Energies. Now, we assume that the offer price per kWh 
is neither set by the distributor nor the market. The customer decides it by himself. 
Certainly, the customer has to set the price to a reasonable level so that the offer will 
be accepted by the distributor. When the buy-back program is activated, the 
distributor needs to choose among those offers so as to fulfill the extra demand as 
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well as maximize the profit. We can note that since the customers reduce their usual 
consumption by participating the buy-back program, the anticipated extra demand 
will reduce accordingly. 
Indeed, it is a kind of demand postponement management (See Iyer, Deshpande and 
Wu [12]). When demand is likely to exceed short term capacity, a fraction of 
demands from "regular" period are postponed and satisfied during a "postponement' 
period. This permits capacity to be procured to satisfy the postponed demands. A 
reimbursement per unit is paid to customers whose demands are postponed. In our 
case, extra demand of energy is expected during peak load period. Buy-back 
programs are then activated. The energy distributors reimburse customers who 
commit to reduce the load so that the demand for this time-block will not fall short. 
In this thesis, our objective is to maximize the total profit that the distributor can gain 
from (i.) the saving of buying extra demand from the spot market and (ii.) the profit 
of re-selling the extra energy to the spot market. 
The problem can be formulated as a general mixed integer-programming model. We 
assume there are no fixed costs associated with the buy-back program. The objective 
function simply includes two kinds of costs as mentioned in the above paragraph. 
The constraint is to fulfill the extra demand during peak load period. Then we further 
modified the model into a problem resemblant to the 0-1 knapsack model, which in 
turn can be solved by pseudo-polynomial algorithms. 
At the beginning, we assume that all the variables are deterministic and design the 
basic model which is similar to the knapsack model. Afterwards, we change some of 
the variables into stochastic and modify the basic model. We generate sets of data to 
implement the models to see how the results are. We find that the acceptance 
patterns do not vary much for different models. They follow the basic rules for 
acceptance including (a.) accepting those offers with the lowest bidding prices; (b) 
for those offers with bidding prices which are higher than the market price will 
definitely not be accepted and (c.) amounts associated with offers can affect the 
acceptance solutions. The models will accept those offers with higher bidding prices 
if the aggregate amounts fit the extra demand well. At last, a heuristics algorithm 
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with the running time of 0{N log N) + 0{m log m) + 0(N) is proposed to solve the 
models. 
A1.4 Literatures Review 
Electricity auctions problems are relatively new issues. Research papers on that can 
be traced back to the 1990s. However, auction theory is examined by a number of 
authors earlier, most notably Vickrey [20], Wilson [24], Klemperer, P. and M. Meyer 
[13], Back and Zender [2], Wang and Zender [22] and Ausubel and Cramton [1]. 
These papers examine auctions of divisible goods ("share auctions") in a multi-
player context, where at least some players demand more than one unit of the good. 
The background of auctions is described in Appendix. 
Actually, energy is different from other goods. It cannot be stored economically and 
there is no elasticity of demand for electricity as well. These unique features together 
with the de-regulation of electricity markets in some countries such as England, New 
Zealand and several eastern US states make the fierce competition in electricity 
wholesale market. In liberalized energy markets at least some wholesale electricity is 
typically traded in an auction-like environment (See Quintero [15]). 
Most of the researchers study the economic theory regarding electricity auctions. 
Federico and Rahman [7] pointed out that one of the main elements of the current 
reform of electricity trading in the UK is the change from a uniform price auction in 
the wholesale market to discriminatory pricing. They analyze this change under two 
polar market structures (perfectly competitive and monopolistic supply), with 
demand uncertainty. They study and compare pricing rules of electricity auctions. 
Quintero [15] raises a question that has been greatly overlooked in the design of 
auctions is how to bundle electricity. He states that the most common approach is to 
separate the daily market into hourly or half-hourly markets and ask generators to 
submit different bids for each market. However, it does not match with the cost 
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structure of generators. He mentions that Elmaghraby and Oren [5] suggest an 
alternative approach that they call "horizontal" auctions which brings the auction 
dimension closer to the cost structure of generators; but incentive compatibility 
problems arise from the pricing rule. Quintero proposes an alternative auction that 
allows for both horizontal and vertical bids to solve the problem. 
On the other hand, Rothkopf [17] focuses the study on a narrowly targeted and 
automatic remedy that will keep suppliers with the capacity and incentive for 
exercising market power from any role in setting the market-clearing price. Besides, 
Fehr and Harbord [8] give us a detailed description of competition in electricity spot 
market. They describe the competitive pool in several countries such as England and 
Wales, Australia and so on. They use different approaches like "Capacity-
Constrained, Bertrand Competition", "Auction", etc., to analyze electricity spot 
markets theoretically. Besides, they show the design of electricity auction including 
its activity rules. 
Besides, more and more quantitative analysis regarding electricity auctions is studied 
by scholars. Relevant topics include unit load commitment, bidding strategy, demand 
postponement management, demand allocation and even power distribution 
planning, etc. 
Unit load commitment algorithms have been used for decades by utilities to schedule 
generation resources minimizing their costs. Hobbs, Jitprapaikulsam and 
Maratukulam [10] find that load forecast errors can yield suboptimal unit 
commitment decisions and the economic cost of inaccurate forecasts is assessed by a 
combination of forecast simulation, unit commitment optimization, and economic 
dispatch modeling for several different load systems. Under-forecasts result in 
purchases of expensive peaking or spot market power; over-forecasts inflate start-up 
and fixed costs because too much capacity is committed. They figure out that the 
value of improved accuracy depends on load and generator characteristics. 
Iyer, Deshpande and Wu [12] focus on demand postponement as a tool to manage 
demand surges. The basic idea of demand postponement is that by preempting 
stockouts through demand postponement, the overall stockout costs can be reduced. 
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They suggest a range of distributions to capture the nature of demand surges. They 
use utility consumption as one of the examples to construct the base model. This 
model determines the optimal regular and postponement period capacities, and the 
demand splitting rule in order to minimize the supplier's expected cost. 
They show the time-line of events for the base model in Figure A 1.2 and the 
descriptions of the model structure are highlighted as follows: 
1. It is a two-periods model - the regular period and the postponement period. A 
planning period exists before the realization of demand. 
2. The supplier chooses an initial capacity ky at the start of the planning period 
at a unit capacity cost of c, based on the demand distribution/(;c| 没 o). 
3. Supplier receives an update jcq on the demand distribution, where XQ is a draw 
from the prior demand distribution. 
4. The demand distribution/(jc | xq, OQ) is updated. 
5. A fraction (1 - /? (^o)) of the demand is chosen, and informed, that their 
demand will be satisfied during the postponement period. All postponed 
demand units are reimbursed s per unit for demand postponement. The 
associated customers reschedule some of their activities based on the fraction 
Pannounced. 
6. A capacity choice ^2(^0), which we refer to as ki for simplicity is made, at a 
unit cost C3, to satisfy demand during the postponement period. 
7. Demand realization X occurs. 
8. Demand for regular period is satisfied using k\ and subcontracting at a cost of 
9. Some known fraction 1 - (^of the postponed demand might not be retained in 
the postponement period. For example, some customers may not be willing to 
accept the postponement arrangement, and hence their demands are lost. 
Demand for postponement period (X2 = - (xo))X) is satisfied using k: 
and subcontracting at a cost of C4. 
They conclude that demand postponement is one approach to manage demand. Other 
ways to regulate demand include pricing, lead time quotes, priorities etc. 
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Figure A1.2: Time line of decisions (extracted from [12]) 
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In our research, the concept is about the demand postponement but our emphasis is 
on how to choose customers for reimbursement. In this case, our cost function 
includes lesser terms. 
A1.5 Organization of Thesis Part A 
This part consists of five chapters. A general introduction is presented in Chapter 
Al . In Chapter A2, we formulate the deterministic model and propose a pseudo-
polynomial time algorithm to solve the model. Experimental results are also included 
to show the possible patterns. In Chapter A3, we further extend the basic models 
built in Chapter A2 by setting two of the variables to be randomized within a certain 
range. Besides, we also study and analyze the numerical experiments of this 
stochastic model. Afterwards, a heuristic algorithm is proposed to solve the 
stochastic model in Chapter A4. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Chapter A5. Other 





A2.1 Models Descriptions and Notations 
Suppose the electricity distributor receives N offers from the customers for the 
upcoming peak period. These N offers are ordered in ascending order of price; i.e., 
q < C2 where c,. is the unit bidding price. Associated with these offers are 
the amounts of electricity: q ” q ” ... , ^^ . The distributor expects he will face an 
extra demand of Q (related to the peak load). Whereas is the unit spot price of 
electricity and is determined by market. For the ease of reading, the notations are 
I summarized in the following table: 
Table A2.1: Notations and Meanings of Deterministic Model 
Notations Meanings 
N Number of offers 
^ Unit bidding price of offer i, 
‘ where i = i,2, N 
Amount of electricity of offer i, 仏 where i= 1,2, ...,7V 
� Extra demand of electricity 
(or shortage of power) 
P„ Unit spot market price of electricity 
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We would like to know how to choose among N offers so as to minimize the cost or 
maximize the profit. 
A2.2 Assumptions 
For the basic model, some assumptions are made as follows: 
1. The N offers are ordered in ascending order of price: c, < C2 < • • • < c^ . 
2. The distributor is relatively small so that his demand has little impact on the 
market, i.e. both sell and buy at for any amount. 
3. A fraction of offer is not allowed to accept. If a customer enroll 1000 kWh and 
once it is accepted, the distributor will have to buy back the whole amount of 
1000 kWh but not 500 kWh or 600 kWh, etc. 
4. Total amount of electricity associated with all the offers is larger than the extra 
demand: N 
/=i 
5. Re-selling of extra buy-back electricity back to the market is not considered in 
the deterministic model. 
6. Once a customer's offer is accepted, she will fulfill it completely. In the utility 
example, if the customer who has committed a certain amount of load reduction 
but does not fulfill it, she will have to pay the spot price for the quantity that she 
fails to commit to. 
A2.3 Mathematical Models 
When the distributor faces an extra demand of Q (shortage of power) which she must 
fulfill, she may (i.) accept buy-back offers from the customers, and/or (ii.) buy 
electricity from the spot market directly. 
1 6 
Define the variable x.: 
_ r 1, if offer i with bid price c丨 and amount q. is accepted 
L 0， otherwise 
Then, the distributor may bear two kinds of cost. The first one is the buy-back cost 
while the other one is the cost of buying electricity from spot market if there still 
have any shortage. 
Let 0 )+ = max(0, jc), the costs can be expressed as follows: 
1. The buy-back cost: 
N 
. (A2.1) 1=1 
2. The cost of buying electricity from the spot market: 
f ^ y 
P„. (A2.2) V 1=1 
In order the minimize the total cost, i.e., (A2.1) + (A2.2), the following objective 
function comes out: 
N f X 
Minimize + p„ , (A2.3) 
/=i V 1=1 y 
where the demand of Q must be met: 
Subject to 
^ ( A 丫 （A2.4) 仏 Q-^q^x. >Q. (=1 V 1=1 y 
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A2.4 Transforming and Re-writing the Models 
At this stage, we try to change this formulation from minimization to maximization. 
Since the electricity distributor must commit the extra demand Q, which means even 
if there is no any buy-back program, she has to buy all the insufficient electricity 
from the market. Thus the total cost is Q p^. When the distributor accepts an offer, 
say offer i, she then has a saving of {p^ if >c,. • The more offers he 
accepts, the more saving he has. Then, the total savings would be: 
N 
Y^iPa -cdq^x. . (A2.5) 1=1 
But if the objective is to maximize (A2.5) only, the distributor may accept all the 
offers. Therefore, we have to control the acceptance of offers in priority until the 
total amount of electricity accepted equals or larger than Q. Most often, total amount 
of electricity accepted may not exactly equal Q. That is why we have to revise 
(A2.5) by subtracting p^y from it, where y is partial amount of electricity of an 
offer. It is needed since Q has been fulfilled already and y is not the actual saving. 
Thus, the modified objective functions become: 
N 
Maximize - — p^y. (A2.6) 
f=i 
Subject to 
、七 n (A2.7) 
1=1 
X丨.e [0,1]. i= 1,2,3, . . . , N 
Now, let ‘ X =max 仏. 
I 
As mentioned before, y is only a part of the total amount of electricity of an offer. 
That is: 
^ 礼咖. (A2.8) 
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(A2.8) can be expressed as: 
y = (A2.9) 
where z is a continuous variable between 0 and 1, i.e., 
0 < z < l . 
After substitute (A2.9) into (A2.6) and (A2.7), we have the following mixed integer 
programming (MIP) model: 
N 
Maximize 公 + p „ q _ z . (A2.10) 
1=1 
Subject to 
N (A2 11) 
1=1 
0 < z < l , 
；c. e [o, l]. i= 1 , 2 , 3 , … , N 
At this time, let g而= ^NH and (A2.12) 
z = x叫. （A2.13) 
Similarly, we substitute (A2.12) and (A2.13) into (A2.10) and (A2.11), the MIP 
model can be re-written into: 
N 
Maximize -c , )^ ,^ , + 义/v+i . (A2.14) 
(=1 
Subject to 
^ ^ (A2.15) 
1=1 
0 < JC^ I^ < 1. (A2.16) 
；c,. G [O, l]. / = 1,2,3, ...,N 
In this stage, we can find that this MIP model is similar to a 0-1 knapsack problem. 
This is the reason why we perform the above transformation. A brief introduction 
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regarding knapsack model is described in the following section. Besides, dynamic 
programming algorithms for solving this model are studied as well. 
A2.5 0-1 Knapsack Problem 
A2.5.1 Knapsack Model Description 
The 0-1-knapsack problem is a kind of combinatorial problems which can be 
formulated generally as follows [16]: 
Minimize / ( x ) 
Subject to 
8i{x)>b.; i = l,...,m; 
hj(x) = Cj ； y = l ” . ” � . 
Here, x is a vector of decision variables, and /(•) , ^.(0 and hj(•) are general 
functions. 
In the knapsack problem, given a knapsack of capacity W and N objects 
Op O2’ …，ON having weights w” w” and profits values P” P2，...’ PN ’ select 
some subset of these objects to be placed in the knapsack, so that the profit of the 
objects in the knapsack is maximized, while not violating its capacity constraints. 
In order to do the associate with object o,. a binary variable jc. such that 
_ � 1， if object o. is in the knapsack 
L 0， otherwise 
2 0 
The problem can be expressed as follows: 
N 
Maximize Yj Pi^i (A2.17) 
Subject to 
^ • (A2.18) 
1=1 
•X, e [0,1] I = 1 ,2 ,3 , ...,N 
A2.5.2 Solving Knapsack Problem by Dynamic Programming 
We can solve this standard 0-1-knapsack problem by means of dynamic 
programming [18]. Dynamic programming is a way of solving decision problems by 
finding an optimal strategy. In which, problems can be broken down into a sequence 
of single decisions made one after the other and problems where several decisions 
can be separated to give this same structure. The ideas at the root of dynamic 
programming were put forward by Richard Bellman in two books (Bellman [3] and 
Bellman & Dreyfus [4]) and several research papers. Dynamic programming can be 
applied to any problem for which an optimal solution of the problem can be derived 
by composing optimal solutions of a limited set of 'subproblems', regardless of how 
these solutions have been obtained. This is generally called the principle of 
optimality. 
The first thing we must do is to break the decision into a sequence of simple choices. 
At each step we have to decide whether or not to include the product. For dynamic 
programming we need to define states and stages. The stages of the problem 
correspond to the number of decisions that have still to be made. At the start we have 
N decisions, then AM，until all the decisions have been taken. In each of these stages 
we have problems to be solved with only one variable. We try to find the best value 
of a particular decision variable for that stage. Because it will not be possible to 
know the consequences of the other N-\ decisions, it will generally be essential to 
find the best value for decision variables for several different states at each stage. 
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Suppose we are at stage n and there is capacity for b units in the knapsack. If we 
define f* {h) as the value of the optimal load that we can prepare from this state and 
stage, we shall see that: 
K � =m a x { /二 (b), p 丨,+ /二 (b - w„)} ifb> w„ (A2.19) 
/,:(办）=/二⑷ if hew, , (A2.20) 
with 
fo*(b) = 0 Vb 
In words, the best that we can do in stage n and with state b is the better of not 
loading any of item n ( ( b ) ) and loading item n and facing the next decision with 
a state reduced by its weight ( i b - W „ ) ) provided that b is large enough to allow 
this to happen. 
A2.5.3 The Algorithm & its Complexity 
The algorithm can be summarized as follows: 
for w = 0 to W /[0’w]=0 
for i = iioN 
f[m=o 
for i = I ioN 
for w = 0 to W 
if Wi <= w // item i can be part of the solution 
if Pi +f[i-\,w-wi] >f[i-l,w] 
f[i,w] = bi+f[i-i,w- w,] 
else 
fUM =/I>l，w] 
else f[i,w] = / [ / - l ,w] // w,. > w 
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Running time analysis: 
for w 二 0 to W 1 
/[0,w] = 0 I 卿 
for i = { to N 
f o r / = l t o i V I Repeat iV times 
for w = 0 to W J 0(W) 
<the rest of the code> 
Thus, the running time of this algorithm is 0(NW). 
A2.6 Solving the Problems by Dynamic Programming 
In our model stated in section A2.4, it is obvious that both (A2.14) and (A2.15) are 
similar to (A2.17) and (A2.18) respectively except that (A2.14) and (A2.15) include 
an extra continuous variable which is expressed by (A2.16). Similarly, we also 
apply dynamic programming to this model. 
A2.6.1 Recursive Functions 






The recursive functions: 
f : (") = max{/:_i {b), - c„)仏,+ /：_, (b - q j if 0<b< q„ (A2.21) 
f:ib) = /；_,ih) if q„<b<Q (A2.22) 
and 
f L ( b ) = max]/；(b), ^ a x [p„�+ix"+i f ; � b -�制 ) ] j (A2.23) 
A2.6.2 Computational Complexity 
(A2.21) and (A2.22) need 0{NQ) which is the same as an usual knapsack problem. 
(A2.23) need 0(N(Q + QMAX)) to perform. The running time of this algorithm is 
therefore 0{NQ) + 0(A^(Q + Q,nax)), which is a pseudo-polynomial algorithm. 
A2.7 Numerical Results 
We generate sets of data to implement the model. We assume that the data are 
normal distributed, while some of the parameters are predicted from the actual data 
of We Energies [23]. 
A2.7.1 Spot Market Price is much Higher than the Offer Prices 
Data set A2.1 
TV 二 81 offers; 
Q = 39,652 kWh {mean = 40,000; standard deviation = 500)\ 
p„ = $30/kWh {mean = 25; standard deviation = 5); 
q {mean =2.5; standard deviation = 0.5)\ 
q^ (mean = 800; standard deviation = 400)., 
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where these N offers with total amount of 68,153 kWh are ordered in ascending 
order of price; i.e., c, <C2 
After solving, we have the following results: 
Table A2.2: Acceptance Results of Data set A2.1 
Offer I c. I q. Accept or not 
1 i 1 . 1 2 i " " “ 6 8 7 1 
2 丨 1 . 3 9 i 3 8 2 1 
3 1 . 5 5 i 8 6 7 1 
4 1 . 5 8 i 1 , 2 4 6 1 
5 1 . 6 2 � 1 , 0 4 5 1 
6 I 1 7 3 I . . . . . — . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2 4 1 
7 i 1 . 8 7 " 1 9 7 3 1 
8 i 1 . 9 1 I 6 5 6 1 
9 1 . 9 4 1 9 6 0 1 
10 ….1； 9 5 1 830"""" 1 
i  
1 1 1 . 9 6 7 9 4 1 
1 2 1 . 9 7 9 2 — 1 
13 1.98 丨 1,158 1 
14 2 ^ 0 6 1 548 1 .：： 
15 2；67——1,2^ 1  
16 ： 2.08 1,148 —1 
1 7 2 . 0 9 3 9 0 1 
18 2.12 ； 1,204 1 
— 1 9 ： . . . . . ！ . . . . . . . . . 2 l 3 ！ 8 8 9 ： . 1 
..._ 20 — ^ 1 3！…8 3 7 —：丄 
“ 2 1 2 . 1 4 i 4 0 0 “ ‘ T 
22 ！ 2.18 I 628 1 
2 3 I 2 . 1 9 i 3 1 5 1 
2 4 2 . 2 0 1 , 0 8 3 1 
2 5 Z 2 8 ！ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 , 0 9 7 ^ … ： [ ： ： 
2 6 I 2 . 3 1 i 2 5 2 — — f 
2 7 I 2 . 3 1 8 5 8 1 
^ 2 8 1 . . . — ^ S F 1 ； 4 1 8 1 
2 9 1 — Z 3 3 “ ]. 1 ， 0 兮 ： — T — ” — 
3 0 厂 2 . 3 3 ‘‘1.•‘. 4 8 ? ‘ — . “ — . . — ' T  
3 1 2 . 3 5 6 2 3 1 
32 2.36 丨 1,381 1 
显.；—2.38 ： 980 1 
—"“"34"".....—丨......乏：！^丁.- f....... 
3 5 2 . 4 P — 9 9 1 “ “ 1 
3 6 — [ 2 . 4 0 " t l " , 0 2 5 1 
3 7 2 . 4 1 i 4 9 3 1 
3 8 2 . 4 4 3 5 2 1 
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T a b l e A 2 . 2 : c o n t i n u e d 
Offer 丨 Cf Qi Accept or not 
3 9 . 2 . 4 5 ^ 8 5 2 1 
40 \ 2.49 丨 350 1 
. " 4 1 ； . . . 7 2 4 9 — . 丨 1 9 0 ： — L  
4 2 " 2.54... .；一 .... 247 「 . “ - ^ i    
43 2.55 _ 1,06^^ 1 
44 i 2.56—丨…T^ 909"“― — —1 
45 ！ 2.56 I 191 1 
4 6 — 2 . 5 7 ‘ 6 8 2 1 
： 4 7 2 . 5 7 610 1 
4 8 I 2 . 5 8 1 9 9 2 1 — “ — — 
I ¥ 
4 9 2 . 5 9 1 . 1 8 8 1 
5 0 2 . 5 9 1 , 4 1 5 0 
— 5 1 2 . 6 3 9 7 0 
52 2 ^ 6 3 f 2 3 1 1 
5 3 2 . 6 6 1 , 1 6 1 0 
—_.54— 2.66 …： 7 6 4 0 
— , 5 5 — J _ _ _ Z 6 7 8 0 9 0 
—56 2；69 1,252 =...[:....... 
5 7 2 . 7 0 1,071 —"5"——— -
_ _ — . 5 8 卜 2 . 7 0 1 . 3 1 7 0 
5 9 i 2 . 7 4 8 4 9 0 
60 2.79 ：丨267 1 
61 2^82 1；590 0 
6 2 … . . 2 ^ 8 4 3 3 4 0  
63 ^ ^ 8 6 1,021 O" 
64 ] 2；88 1,168 0 
6 5 _ Z 9 3 1 , 1 4 0 ： 0 — 
66— 2.96 I 1,150 ： ： 了 — = 
67 — I . . . . . . ' . 3 . 0 0 �9 p O " . . — 
68 ：— a 0 2 “ . . . . I 9 ? 0 —.— 0 
69 3.03 ！ 922 0 
7 0 3 . 0 6 i 1 , 4 9 0 0 
71 丨 3 . 1 T : : . : . . . — ^ 1 7 — 二 ： ： — I ―： 
72 I' 3.11™" ""531—一 I f 
7 3 1 3 . 2 5 — 3 5 6 0 
7 4 3 . 2 6 1 8 9 0 
75—. —3^ 27..............I..............1^ 096 ] 
"76 ！ '“！；；^厂；:.-953 . .“———‘—一 
7 7 i . . . . 3 ； 2 9 ' " — — 7 4 5 0 
7 8 I 3 ' 3 5 — 1 3 3 — . . . . 0 
7 9 I SM I 1 ； 3 1 9 0 
. . . . . .i^: I a 5 7 i . ........ 562 0 
s T — '3.60 —r,'057 — 0 " — 
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Here x^^^ = 0.981142 ； total amount of electricity associated with the accepted offer 
is 39,656 kWh while the extra demand Q is 39,652 kWh. 
From the above example, we find that when the spot market price is much higher 
than the offers prices, (in our examples, the market price is more than 7 times higher 
than the bidding prices), the model tends to accept offers with lower bidding price. It 
is not surprised that the model accepts offer 1 to 49 but instead of accepting offer 50， 
51 and 53 to 59, the model accepts offer 52 and 60 which have higher bidding prices. 
It is due to the amounts associated with these offers do not well fit the amount of 
extra demand. Amount of offer 51 is too few while that of other offer are too many. 
This outcome coincides with the result of a general knapsack problem. 
A2.7.2 Spot Market Price is almost the Same as the Offer 
Prices 
In the meantime, it is also interesting to see how the results vary when the spot 
market price is not that higher than the bidding prices. Thus, some offer prices may 
be higher than the market prices while some may be lower than the market prices or 
even the same as the market price. Now, we also generate a set of data to study the 
acceptance pattern and data are assumed to be normal distributed, whereas some of 
the parameters are predicted from the actual data of We Energies [23]. 
Data set A2.2 
N = U offers; 
Q = 39,031 kWh {mean = 40,000; standard deviation = 500); 
p„ = $2.72/kWh {mean = 2.5; standard deviation 二 
c, {mean =2.5; standard deviation = 0.5)\ 
q^ {mean = 800; standard deviation = 400)', 
where these N offers with total amount of 66,677 kWh are ordered in ascending 
order of price; i.e., c, <---<c；^. 
Please note that the mean and standard deviation of p^ are the same as that of c.. 
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After solving, we have the following results: 
Table A2.3: Acceptance Results of Data set A2.2 
Offer I c. q. Accept or not 
1 I —0.76"”I 2 9 8 — t “ 一 
2 ""1.48 丨—86—— f — 
3 1 . 5 4 i 1 3 7 1 
4 1—1；58 ... 963 i  
‘ — — — 1 i T 6 2 200 1 
6 i 1 . 7 5 7 5 3 1 
7 I 1 . 7 6 6 8 8 " " T 
8 I 1.84 ‘ 1618 1 
9 1.89 764 1 
1 0 V 8 9 ！ 1 2 9 5 1 
1 1 1^91—...1——.‘.访.1 1 — . . ： 
1 2 I 1 . 9 4 ： 1 1 9 1 1 — 
13 1.94 864 1 
1 4 — — — 2 m 1 5 2 9 i  
— 1 5 ‘ i.....2X)2 124 1 
J 6 i 2 . 0 2 4 3 6 1 
1 7 i 2 . 0 7 1 3 3 5 1 
1 8 2 . 0 8 I 2 5 4 1 
1 9 2 . 0 8 i 3 4 6 1 
20 :極.......1 606 1 : 
2 1 : — 2 1 1 8—5云 1 — 
2 2 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 J 2 9 5 6 1 
2 3 2 . 1 5 8 1 1 
24 2.15—.——1345 1— 
2 5 — 2 . 1 9 T 
26 2.21 .1.........496 — T —. 
27 ！ 2.22 丨 891 1 
2 8 I 2 . 2 3 i 9 8 9 1 
2 9 i 2 . 2 3 ： 1 2 3 1 
一 .30"丨—...2.25............I 606 ——I  
31 . ..1 2.36 — i. ….... T “ — 
3 2 ！— 2； 3 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 4 4 T 
^33 丨 — I 1207 1 二—. —34 — — - —1--——— 
— 3 5 . ...n一" 一—一— 4 7 3 — —.T —.. 
. 3 6 ；. 2.39—：：—732 1 
37 ： 2.39 1326 1 
— ^ —：.........]至 1274 1 
39 ： …——1320"— 1 — 
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Table A2.3: continued 
Offer I c. ； q. Accept or not 
40 丨 2.48“‘1156 1 
4 1 . 2 ^ 9 … … . . i 3 2 2 1 •—• — - . i  
4 2 2 . 5 0 6 3 7 1 
： … • • ；      
4 3 i 2 . 5 0 丨 5 5 2 1 
- ； — • - -
4 4 I 2 . 5 1 1 6 0 9 1 
4 5 I 2 . 5 3 i 8 6 4 1 
46 2.57 丨 396 1 
4 7 2 ~ 5 8！ 1 4 9 7 1 — 
4 8 2.58..........；—1013 1 ：....... 
~ 4 9 丨―2.60 I 1769 0 — 
50 .….2；60. I—615 1 
51 2.67 ！ 268 1 
5 2 1 2 . 6 7 _ 一 1 1 4 0 3 0 — … 
5 3 „ L 2 . 7 0 1 1 2 " " " " 1 
5 4 " 1 2 . 7 0 8 0 5 6 
5 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . — . 2 J 2 . i — 6 2 3 0 
… . 5 6 2 ^ 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 9 4 0 
....57 "2^76.... i 768 0 
5 8 1 . . . . . . . . . . 2 . 7 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i 1 2 7 4 0 
t • . j • • ...„‘. •一,一.‘,w一"w,,.,一…….•.....‘.  
5 9 I 2 . 7 6 ： 3 7 9 0 
6 0 2 . 8 2 i 1 1 3 2 0 
6 1 2 . 8 2 丨 1 0 8 8 0 
6 2 . . — 2 : 9 1 . . . . . . ‘ . ！ — " 6 2 0 " O — — — . 
6 3 一 — 2 . 9 1 I 9 4 3 0 — ： 
64 2.92 丨 1645 0 
65 2.95 丨 927 0 
. . . . . 6 6 Z 9 7 — 丨 — 8 4 0 0 
6 7 1 2 : . 9 9 [ . . 9 4 2 0 
—i 3.00 「—461 ~0 一 
69 j "aooT"�—155"“― — 0 ―― 
7 0 3 . 0 3 ‘ 2 9 3 0 
71 3；03丨:540 0 
72 3.06 ——1350 —石了:— 
7 3 . . . . . . . ‘ — I — . 3 . 0 6 " 1 7 8 0 . . . . . — — 
......74 ：：.......3^09 1803 0 
. . . — . . . 7 5 3 l 0 — . ] ' 1 2 7 1 0 
7 6 — 3 . 2 7 1 4 1 6 0 ’—. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
77 —..—…狂厂: 188 ：―：万 
78 ： 3.28 T^O" — 一 —0 
........79 3；31 979 0 
8 0 ： 3 5 5 I 8 9 9 0 
8 1 3 . 5 6 7 6 5 0 
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This time, = 1 and total amount of electricity associated with the accepted offer 
is 39,008 kWh while the extra demand Q is 39,031 kWh. Since the bidding prices of 
offer 57-81 are higher than the market price ($2.72)，we ensure that the model must 
not select among these offers. The insufficient amounts of 23 kWh can be bought 
from the market. These are obvious and possible results because buying the 
insufficient amount of electricity from the market will lower the overall cost. On the 
other hand, although offer 49 and 52 ($2.60 and $2.67 respectively) have lower 
bidding prices than the market price ($2.72), the model prefer buying the insufficient 
amounts from the market rather than selecting them. It is due to the large quantity 




In this chapter, we further extend the basic models built in Chapter A2 by setting the 
extra demand Q and market price p^ to be randomized within a certain range, while 
the objective is to minimize the total cost incurred. First of all, we suppose the extra 
energy demand (2 is a random variable with a finite set of demand values. 
A3.1 Models with Uncertain Extra Demand Q 
Models in this section are the same as the model described in Chapter A2 except that 
the extra demand (2 is a random discrete variable now. Suppose Q have a known 
probability distribution Pr(<i",)，with Pr(6?,„) > 0 for m G D , where D is a finite set 
of demand values. We assume that d’” are indexed so that d. < dj is equivalent to 
i<j and = 
meD 
Besides, we also consider selling the residual energy back to the market in this 
model. Thus, we denote the market price of a unit of energy by and the price of 
selling back to the market by p^. At this point, we assume that > . Likewise, 
we would like to know how to choose among N offers so as to minimize the cost or 
maximize the profit. 
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Given a realization, the profit function can be written as 
N r N Y f N y 
H ^ i ^ i ^ i + P a Q - T / l i X i - P b ^ ^ i h - Q . (A3.1) 
'•=1 V 1=1 y V 1=1 7 
Before replacing Q by its expected value, we try to simplify (A3.1) first. 
Re-writing (A3.1): 
N f N Y f N y Z^.^/-^/ + Po Q-Yu^i^i -Pb T/h^i -Q '•=1 V 1=1 / V 1=1 
N f N � f N y 1 / N y = + Po 乂 + ^Qi^i-Q -Pb '=1 V 1=1 y V 1=1 y V (=1 N r N \ f N Y f N Y 
= P a £仏又,一 2^ -Pt 
1=1 \ 1=1 y V 1=1 y V /=i 
N f N � / N y 
=Ya'^i^i^i+Pa Q-T^Qi^i +{Pa-P,) ^^li^-Q 
'=1 V (=1 y V 1=1 
N f N \ f N Y 
'=1 V 1=1 / V 1=1 
N f N y 
= - P„)qiX�+ + - PiJ ^q^x.-Q 
1=1 V 1=1 
If taking expectation for Q, then p^Q is a constant and thus it can be neglected from 
our objective function. 
N N Y 
T i ' ^ i - P n h i ^ i + i P a - P , ) J ^ ^ i ^ i - Q • (A3.2) 
'=1 V /=i 
Replace Q by its expected value, 
N / N y ^ 
1=1 V 1=1 
N IV 
二 t / i i X i - Q (A3.3) '=1 [V 1=1 y 
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The objective function is 
N f N A + 
2 > / - Pahi^i + P r ( 0 . I > . 义,-d„, ’ (A3.4) '=1 msD V /=1 J 
where p = 
f N Y 
Denote V „ > & 
V 1=1 y 
广 〜 V 
K = • V 1=1 y 
After replacing, the following linear programming is obtained: 
N 




( = 1 
x. e [O, l] 1,2,3, ...,N 
It is found that if c. - p ^ > 0 , ；c. = 0. In words, if the bidding price of offer i is 
higher than the market price, offer i will definitely not be accepted. It is because the 
cost can be lower if the distributor buys the extra demand from the market with a 
cheaper price. 
Proposition A3.1 If c.-p^ >0, x,. = 0 • V/. 
N 




Note that <^(y;)>0,VV；. 
Case 1: 
C i -P„ >0, Vi 
i.e.厂 
Since VV,； , the optimal solutions should be 
\fi,m,n. 
Therefore, offer i will not be accepted. 
Case 2: 
Denote V~ be the current feasible solutions. 
CJ-p„>0,3j 
If Xj = 1, i.e. accept offer j. 
The current feasible solutions become + qjXj. 
Both y{x.) and ) will increase in this case. Thus, it is not an 
optimal solution by setting Xj = 1. Therefore, we should not select 
offer i. 
A3.2 Models with Uncertain Spot Market Price Pa 
Now, Pn is a random discrete variable while other variables are kept fixed. Suppose 
p„ have a known probability distribution Pr(p„) , with P r ( p „ ) > 0 for ne K , 
where K 'ls a. finite set of market price values. We assume that are indexed so that 
Pi < Pj is equivalent to i < j and = 1. 
neK 
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Besides, we assume that the price selling back to the market p^ equals ap^ ’ where 
0 < 1. Refer to (A3.2), we replace p^ by a p ^ . Then we get the following: 
N f N \ + 
Z (C/ — Pa hi^i + {Pa -CCPo) Z qiXi - Q '=1 V 1=1 J 
N f N \ + 
= Z - Po hi^i + (l - z - Q (A3.7) '=1 V 1=1 y 
Replace p^ by its expected value, 
N f N y^ 
1=1 V (=1 
N f N \ + 
=T^k - + E(p„){l-a) t q , x � Q 1=1 V ;=i y 
/V� / �"1 � 1 w Y 
= Z ^/"Z/'n ) ^ih + Z Pn ) (1-^) Z 仏 - Q 
1=1 L niSiK � Lwie/C � V/=1 / 
Denote ；^p,, Pr(p,,) by p, 
f N Y 
V f=i y 
f N Y 
V 1=1 y 
The following linear programming is obtained: 




Y^q^x.+V-V- =Q (A3.9) (=1 
e [O, l] / = 1,2,3, 
Similar to Section A3.1, according to Proposition A3.1, if c. - p > 0 , i.e. if the 
bidding price of offer i is higher than the market price, offer i will definitely not be 
accepted. 
A3.3 Models with Uncertain Extra Demand Q and 
Uncertain Spot Market Price Pa 
A3.3.1 Q and Pa are independent variables 
In this section, both Q and p^ are random variables while other variables are fixed. 
Suppose Q have a known probability distribution P r ( d J ’ with Pr(J ,„)>0 for 
me D, where D is a finite set of demand values. We assume that d丨” are indexed so 
that d. < dj is equivalent to i < j and = 1. 
msD 
Likewise, suppose p^ have a known probability distribution Pr(/7„) , with 
Pr(p„) > 0 for ne K , where A： is a finite set of market price values. We assume that 
p„ are indexed so that p. < p. is equivalent to i< j and ^PrCp,,) = 1. 
neK 
The objective function with Q and p^: 
N f N 
Z (C, - Pa k 义 Z 仏— Q • 1=1 V 1=1 y 
Replace Q and p^ by their expected values, 
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N f N 、+、 
PahiXi+ Pai^-^) > 
、1=1 V 1=1 
N C N 
= Z k - ^(Po hi^i + Pa - (x) - Q > '•=1 [ V 1=1 y 
= Z k - ^(Pa + E{Pa )• (1 - a ) • £ f X - > '=1 V 1=1 y 
N � / �1 � / \1 \f ^ Y � 
= Z c � Z Pn Pr(P„) + X Pn Pr(P,,) . (1 - a) • £ ； ^ 仏.〜-0 > 
'=1 L neK 」 」 y 
(A3.9) 
Define a = \ - a 
(A3.10) 
Denote by p (A3.11) 
neK 
f N Y 
义,乂 (A3.12) v 1=1 y 
f N y 
y : = 心 又 , （A3.13) 
V 1=1 Y 
Substitute (A3.10 - A3.13) into (A3.9), the following linear programming is 
obtained: 
N , _ 
Minimize J^if, 一 pk^丨 + P . (A3.14) '=1 meD 
Subject to 
me D (A3.15) /=i 
X. 6 [O, l] i= 1,2,3, 
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A3.3.2 Q and Pa are dependent variables 
A3.3.2.1 Models Descriptions 
In the last section, we assume that Q and are independent discrete variables. 
Thus, Q and p^ are uncorrelated and the correlation pQ ^^  = 0 . However, in this 
section, we set that Q and are dependent discrete variables. Suppose Q have a 
known probability distribution Pr ( t / J ’ with Pr(fi?,J>0 for m E D , where D is a 
finite set of demand values. We assume that d’” are indexed so that d. < dj is 
equivalent to i < j and ^Pr(<i,„) = l . 
ineD 
Likewise, suppose p^ have a known probability distribution Pr(/7j，with 
Pr(p„ )>0 for jiE K , where AT is a finite set of market price values. We assume that 
Pn are indexed so that p. < p . is equivalent to i< j and 2]Pr(p,,) = l . 
neK 
In the meantime, there exists some correlation between Q and p � w h e r e 
0 < pQ Pn < 1. The known joint distribution of Q and is denoted by Pr((i,,,, p j 
with , ) > 0 for m G D and neK, where D is a finite set of demand values 
and A： is a finite set of market price values. Besides, ^ , p„) = I 
imD neK 
According to (A3.8), the objective function is: 
N f N Y 
Z (C, — Pa k . � E - Q /=i V 1=1 y 
Replace Q and p^ by their expected values, 
N f N 、+、 
…Z (C, - Pa k 太,+ - E 'li^i 一 Q ‘ 
' = i V ( = 1 J 
N f N 、+、 
= X h - ^ ( P o + P a - ~ Q > 
' '=1 [ V 1=1 y 
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N r "1 / yv + 
=Z Pr(pJ 仏.〜+(l-a) 2>(",’,，pj. p„ . 
1=1 L "SK 」 meD hbK V 1=1 7 
(A3.16) 
Define a = \ - a (A3.17) 
Denote ^ p’�Pr(p„) by ~p (A3.18) 
neK 
f N Y 
T / h x � d „ , (A3.19) 
V 1=1 y 
^ N Y 
K ： = 心 — ( A 3 . 2 0 ) 
V ( = 1 y 
Substitute (A3.17 - A3.20) into (A3.16)，the following linear programming is 
obtained: 
N , . 
Minimize . ；^  ’ p,,)./V V,,� （A3.21) 
1=1 imD ibK 
Subject to 
meD (A3.22) 
/ = i 
X. G [o, l] / = 1,2,3, ...,N 
A3.3.2.2 Numerical Results 
Since we cannot get the real world data from electricity distributor, we choose the 
data arbitrarily (with reference to WE Energies) as follows: 
/V=81 offers; 
a = 0 . 5 ; 
Total amount of energy offered = 71,755 kWh; 
where these N offers are ordered in ascending order of price; i.e., c, < c, <"-<c^ . 
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Table A3.1 shows the extra demand and its probability distribution while table A3.2 
is about market price and its probability distribution. Table A3.3 lists the joint 
distribution of Q and ，/?,,). All of the data are generated by MS Excel. 
Table A3.1: Extra Demand and its Probability Distribution 
_ M I 心 I Fr(dJ _ 
1 1 9 8 7 5 0 . 0 1 0 9 9 5 
— 2 2 4 5 6 7 0 . 0 4 4 0 7 
3 3 4 1 7 5 0 . 0 9 8 0 4 2 
4 3 8 1 5 3 a 1 4 4 0 3 5 
— 5 — „ 4 1 5 2 7 a i 7 4 4 6 2 — 
_ _ _ 6 _ 4 9 8 9 7 0 . 2 0 4 2 8 8 
— ^ 5 4 6 2 7 " 0 . 1 5 0 4 2 7 
8 — 5 7 1 4 5 — 0 . 1 1 9 5 8 3 
9 6 6 2 4 1 " ' 0 ~ 0 5 2 8 2 4 
10— —67^ 4 [-5:而辆 
Table A3.2: Market Price and its Probability Distribution 
A^  I I P r f p J 
“ ~ r “ — 1 . 4 0 . 0 4 7 0 2 4 
2 — 1 . 7 0 . 0 5 1 9 2 1 
3 — 1 . 9 0 ^ 0 6 1 1 1 4 丄 幻— QJ33Q43 
5 0 . 1 9 1 8 1 2 
6 — 2 . 9 0 . 1 9 8 2 0 7 
7 — 3 . 4 0 . 1 4 7 2 6 4 
8 — a 0 8 7 6 2 3 
9 4 . 3 " — … a 0 4 7 8 2 1 
10 5.0 0；033371— 
对/O = 7 = Pr G O = $2.81 kWh 
neK 
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Table A3.3: Joint distribution of Q and p^ , p j 
dA 19,875 24,567 34,175 38,153 41,527 49,897 54,627 57,145 60,241 67,454 Pr(p ) 
Pn  
1.4 0.004064 0.006097 0.008128 0.010161 0.012193 0.011177 0.008128 0.006096 0.004064 0.002032 0.047024 
1.7 0.005080 0.007112 0.009551 0.012193 0.014225 0.013209 0.010973 0.008738 0.007519 0.004064 0.051921 
1.9 0.005284 0.009145 0.011583 0.013818 0.016257 0.015241 0.012396 0.011380 0.008941 0.006096 0.061114 
2.1 0.006096 0.009551 0.012396 0.015038 0.018289 0.017273 0.015647 0.012599 0.010770 0.008128 0.133843 
2.5 0.007112 0.010161 0.014225 0.016257 0.020321 0.020321 0.016257 0.014225 0.012193 0.010161 0.191812 
2.9 0.007722 0.009145 0.011786 0.014022 0.018289 0.019305 0.015038 0.013615 0.010973 0.007112 0.198207 
3.4 0.005080 0.006300 0.007925 0.011989 0.016257 0.017273 0.013006 0.010973 0.009551 0.006300 0.147264 
3.8 0.004674 0.005080 0.006909 0.009551 0.014225 0.015241 0.010364 0.008738 0.006909 0.005893 0.087623 
4.3 0.003048 0.004267 0.006503 0.008535 0.012193 0.013209 0.008535 0.006909 0.005487 0.005080 0.047821 
5 0.002032 0.004064 0.006096 0.008128 0.010161 0.011177 0.008128 0.006096 0.005080 0.004064 0.033371 
Pr(d,,,) 0.010995 0.04407 0.098042 0.144035 0.174462 0.204288 0.150427 0.119583 0.052824 0.001273 1 
The correlation coefficient associated with this joint distribution PQ^^ = 0.94 . 
After solving, we have the results shown in Table A3.4 and Table A3.5 summarizes 
the values of and V ' . 
Table A3.4: Acceptance Results 
Offer 分丨 Accept or not 
“ 1 " " “ 4 0 . 7 6 4 T 0 1 
”2 ： 1；47... —2010 1 
—.『…“1:瓦178乏 - --
4 1 . 5 8 4 6 — _ _ J _ — ； 
5 1.62 —"1456 —“iznEr 二 
6 1 . 7 5 5 4 6 — � 
7 1.8 ： 633 1 
. . . . 8 -I Q 4 . 6 4 5 1 ........... 
9— 322 ：―. —— 1 … 
10 J 1 _38 T "952——— T" —.... 
— T f 1 1 . 9 T [ 1 7 ^ . T  
.....12 1.94 .. . . .19^ 1 
. . . . . . ' J 3 — . ‘ . . . . . . 1 . 9 7 2 7 9 6 = T _ —....：：... ~"14 J90 r ：―— 
1 5 2 . 0 2 J T 2 7 1 — 
1 6 2 . 0 5 8 7 1 
1 7 2 . 0 7 1 1 7 4 2 1 
1 8 2 . 0 8 2 1 4 1 
1 9 2 . 0 9 4 0 6 1 一 
41 
Table A3.4: Continued 
Offer i c. I q. Accept or not 
2 0 2 . 1 ！^ 145 1 
21 4 ••乏—‘一—‘———— 1 ——一一“一 
22 2.12 ： “ "165 —..— ——“....1...-= 
2 . 1 3 1 … 5 5 4 .. 1 -
24 ^ J ^ i 6 7 2 1 
"25 2719 i 1 滋 1 
2 6 2 . 2 1 ^ — 9 5 8 — 1 
—..云=:.2.2i^ ..r—— 1 .L ..... •？ • 
28 2.23 丨 130 1 -
29 2.24 ； 682 1 
I 一-".— - — 一 
30 ； 2.25 丨 870 1 —. 
_ 3 1 2 . 2 9 J 1 6 7 8 1 
3 2 ‘ 2 . 3 1 ~ - . . . . . . . . 2 7 ^ = : 1 
33 . 2.33 1…3142— 1—+： 
_ . . . . . _ . 3 4 7 2 . 3 4 1 5 4 6 — — 1 — — “ 3 5 …—“7j—11 of ——.1 36 — 2.38^3^———— 1—-
3 7 2 . 3 9 : ^ T T 9 2 — " 1 
‘ L — L " - - > - . ' - U — I L . . . . . . . . . . - - … . 3 8 2 . 4 2 1 5 3 1 1 
‘ __..... „ . . , , _ ,一一 .一 .„„„, 一-u. 
39 , 2.43 ； 245 1 
4 0 2 . 4 6 1 8 9 5 — 0 
“ ‘ — — - -
41 2.48 丨 1422 0 ‘42 ^ 2.49 H . 1 0 
- ：-••• - —•••”.一 ’打....,，、,..„^.— 
4 3 2 . 5 I 1 8 9 0 0 
44 , 2.51 丨 536 一 0 
45 面......丨......201" — 1 ：：46 —MI I i sr~— 0 ：： 
‘47 2 ^ ； 240 0 
48 丨 2.59 1 '752 0 
~ ‘ ― - - 一 .....， 
4 9 2 . 6 1 4 7 5 0 
50 ： 2.6 [ '70^ — 0 
51 ； 2.67 1 ...642 0 
—： - - ，   
52 2.68 ！ 1120 0 t • • 
5 3 2 . 7 i 9 5 0 
5 4 2 . 7 1 i 9 8 5 0 
55 2.72丨1万运运 0 
5 6 2 J 5 1 9 8 9 0 
57 2.76」互6— 0 — 
2 . 8 — ‘ — — — " O — — — — P 2.81 ；… — 0 
— 6 0 2 . 8 2 ] . . . . . . . . . 1 0 3 6 0 
. 6 1 _ . . . . . 2 ； 8 7 . . . . . . i 8 5 8 — ： 0 . . . . . . . _ = . . . . .：—： . . . . . . . 
62~~ 2.89 ； 2475 0 
6 3 2 . 9 1 � 9 7 I 
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Table A3.4: Continued 
Offer c. q. Accept or not 
6 4 5 6 8 0 
6 5 2 . 9 5 — 3 5 3 0 " — — . 
“.—•‘. —•‘,：：, 二 — —— —  
6 6 2 . 9 7 1 5 4 3 0 
67 "2^99 I T745. . = : . —0......=.—=..... 
3 . 0 0 " I : 0 
6 9 [ " 3 7 O 1 9 9 9 “ — 6 
7 0 ^ . . . . . . 0 
— 7 1 . ‘ . . . . . . 3 . 0 ^ 1 0 7 9 — 0 
7 2 . . . . . . . . . r a 0 6 ~ ' — 1 4 5 0 — 0 
— 7 3 1 3 . 0 7 1 0 4 4 _ _ _ _ _ _ 0 
— 7 4 " 3 . 0 9 4 2 1 0 
. . . 7 5 3 ? i 0 务 7 0 4 0 
— — 7 6 3 . 2 7 ‘ . . . . . . . . . . . T 5 6 0  
7 7 l 3 . 2 8 3 6 0 " " q 
3.29 ； 8 6 ^ 0 
~ 7 9 ~ I 3 . 3 1 7 8 4 0 — 
— 7 ~ 2 4 6 0 
—81— t . . .百] . .YJ^ . -- 0  
Table A3.5: Values of V,； and V„; 
: y： : V；, 
1 0 i 1 8 , 2 3 4 
2 0 I — 1 3 , 5 4 2 
3 0 1 . . . . . . . — . . . . . . . . . . . 3 , 9 3 4 — 
4 44 丨：- 0 — 二 
— . . . . 5 3 , 4 1 8 ！ O " 
6 11,7品」―““^T7I 
7 1 6 , 5 1 8 " ! 0 — — — “ 
8 19,036 丨 —0" 
....~9—-22,132 : =— 0 ： 
10 远:345 — ！ 0 
N N 
Notice that = 0 means ^ ^ . j c . > whereas V~ = 0 means d", > ^(^.jc,.. 
1=1 1=1 
We also test for other sets of data with different market prices, bidding prices, 
quantities associated with offers, extra demand, value of a and Pq 口“. In this thesis, 
we only show one set of data which give us a typical result. Indeed, the models in 
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Chapter A3 are more complex than the models described in Chapter A2. However, 
when we generate data (with reference to WE Energies) to show the acceptance 
solutions, we find that the patterns do not vary much from the basic rules of 
acceptance solution. That is: 
1 • Accepting those offers with the lowest bidding prices. 
2. For those offers with bidding prices which are higher than the market 
price will definitely not be accepted. (Please refer to Proposition A3.1) 
3. Amounts associated with offers can affect the acceptance solutions. The 
models will accept those offers with higher bidding prices if the 




In this chapter, we propose a heuristics algorithm with an acceptable running time to 
solve the models described in Chapter A3. 
Models in different sections of Chapter A3 vary but their framework is almost the 
same. That is, minimizing an objective function which consists of 2 sets of term, x. 
N 
and V~ respectively, whereas all of their constraint include - V~ =D爪 
1=1 
only. Because the concept of this algorithm bases on the framework of the model, it 
is not necessary to repeat it for all the cases. Therefore, we choose the model in 
section A3.1 as an example to demonstrate the algorithm. In this section, all 
descriptions about the model refer to (A3.6) and (A3.7). 
A4.1 Model Analysis 
N 
We realize that (A3.6) can be divided into 2 parts. One is ^ (c , . - 而 and the 
1=1 , N 
Other is ^ V~ . Denote (：^仏义,.，which is the total amount of buy-back 
msD 1=1 
4 5 
f N Y 
energy. Remember that we have defined V~ = 一 D," previously. Now, we 
V 1=1 y 
let v(C) equals the cost penalty due to pi, V~ and <p(C) equals the cost of 
meD 
N 
^ (c , . - p„)qiXi ’ both of which are the function of f . Note that v{C) is a strictly 1=1 
increasing function of ( . On the other hand, all of the buy-back offers are ordered in 
ascending order of price; i.e., c, < Cj < • • • < c^ and c. < p^ for some i, where 
1 < / < N . By this condition, we can know that is either a convex function or a 
decreasing function of f . Kindly note that d”� i s also sorted in ascending order so 
that <i. < dj is equivalent to i < j . The following figures visualize the situation 
depicted above and illustrate the relation of these two functions. 
Figure A4.1: Relation between f and d’” 
c 
个 
_ Total buy-back amount  
八 A 八 八 T 丁 
_ \v： r ' 
\/ - i-J  
V - 厂 
d^ d^ 1^0 
According to our definition, Vg"，V^  and Vjo are 0 in this case. 
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• Vx + Pi y ‘ 
0 ~ i I ~ I ~ I h7H——h………….> ； 
Optimum point 
The objective function is the combination of and which is expressed in 
dotted line. This is also a convex function and therefore there should be an optimum 
point, i.e. the turning point shown in the figure, which can minimize the cost. 
A4.2 Heuristics Algorithm 
In order to find this optimum point, as mentioned before, we have to sort c. and d^^^  
in an ascending order first. Afterwards, slopes of v{C) and values of 识(（）of each 
break point such as q. or d”，are checked. Suppose < for some n and 
n 
slope of v(^) , v ' (^) = ^ p'„’ . It is obvious from the figure that slope of the dotted 
line is the same as that of (p{C) until it reaches d^  of j[；-axis. The slope then changes 
according to the magnitude of slopes of and 识(（）after combination. At the 
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beginning, the slope is negative which means it has not yet reached the optimum 
point. Notice that it is a convex function, that is, a turning point with slope of zero 
must exist. However, since we consider this problem as a discrete model. The 
turning point may not exactly match any of the break point (i.e. q. or d"】）. We 
therefore have to choose the one which is nearest to the turning point. 
Up to this point, we may think that the optimal solution is to accept offer with 
bidding price c,, , ... c._j，c. for some i. However, amount of is too large to 
accept sometimes. The objective value may be even better if we accept q.^ ^ or other 
offer with higher bidding price. The following figure illustrates this point. 
Figure A4.3: Acceptance Preference 
It is too much to accept q^  . ^ � 
t^pl 
t 
Choosing 仏十！ and 仏+3 
demand is even better though 
their prices are higher 
Therefore, when we find out a point which is nearest to the turning point, say c.，we 
can consider that it is definitely a feasible solution but may not be a optimal solution. 
We have to conduct an evaluation to check further then. Firstly, we bypass the last 
offer in the current acceptance list, i.e. c, with amount q. and choose the next offer, 
i.e. with amount 仏十！. Similarly, we check the sign of the slope of + ^ ( f ) 
and compare whether or not the value of the objective function is better. If it is 
better, we neglect offer i and include offer i +1 in the acceptance list. Afterwards, we 
try to include offer i +2 and check the value of objective function again. Otherwise, 
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we choose the next one, c.^ ^ with amount 仏+2 . This evaluation procedure is 
repeated for all offers so as to confirm that the acceptance solution is optimal. 
The algorithm: 
start 
sort c. in ascending order 
sort dm in ascending order 
C = 0,i=l 
for i = I to N 
compute slope v (^) 
if {c^-pJ + v\C)<0 
C = C + 
i = / + l 
else 
compare objective function for ； and ^ - q^  
record the better one 
C = r +知 1 
i =i + l 
end 
A4.3 Computational Complexity 
Sorting of c,. requires 0{N log N), whereas that of d^ needs 0{m log m). For the 
computation and comparison parts, the operations are bounded by 0{N). Thus, the 




A5.1 Summary and findings 
In part A of this research thesis, we do the information survey in order to better 
understand the electricity auction industry after the deregulation of energy market in 
some countries. We have used mathematical models to study what buy-back offers 
that the energy distributors should accept in order to minimize the total cost when 
they face extra demand during peak time. We construct the basic model for 
deterministic variables at the very beginning. This model can be solved by dynamic 
programming with a pseudo-polynomial running time of O ( " 0 + 0(iV(Q + 彻似). 
Thereafter, we study the stochastic settings as well. We consider the case that the 
market price and the extra demand are uncertain. Besides, we propose a heuristic 
algorithm with running time of 0(N log N) + 0(m log m) + 0(AO to solve this 
stochastic model. 
From the results of numerical experiments, we find that offers with lower bidding 
price are more likely to be accepted. Besides, for those offers with bidding prices 
which are higher than the market price will definitely not be accepted. This property 
can be proved mathematically and the numerical results also show the conclusions. 
We cannot ignore that the amounts associated with offers can affect the acceptance 
solutions. The models will accept those offers with higher bidding prices if the 
aggregate amounts fit the extra demand well. This is the typical pattern of a 
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knapsack problem and so we can use this ascendancy to design a more efficient 
algorithm. 
A5.2 Future Research 
Further extension can be done in many areas. Firstly, a specific computer program 
for the proposed algorithms (including the dynamic programming in Chapter A2 and 
the heuristic algorithm in Chapter A4) can be written to implement and compare the 
result in terms of errors as well as the running time with MEP used in this research. If 
possible, it is better to have real world data to apply the models. 
We only accept the whole offer in this research. That is, if we accept offer i, we have 
to buy-back energy of q. kWh. It is also interesting to see what happen if a fraction 
of offer acceptance is allowed. For instance, we can accept only certain amount of 
offer i, say {q. - v ) kWh. If that is the case, the variable jc,. is no longer binary but 
relax between 0 and 1. 
In our study regarding stochastic model, Q and p^ are both discrete variables. We 
may also consider the change them into continuous variables in further study. This 
change will make the model more complex and the objective function becomes: 
Suppose Pn is the market price while p^ is the sell back price. Let Q is bounded by 
Q and have a known density function f{Q). Now, we have to minimize 
义 , ( Q - )fiQ)dQ - p J p ' ' C^q.x, - Q)fiQ)dQ 
Furthermore, we may leam the total profits for T time periods but not only an 
instance time period. The energy market has been deregulated into multiple time-
sequential auction markets like the day-ahead, the intra-day, the adjustment, the 
hour-ahead and the real time markets. Since the energy distributors have to purchase 
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energy within a short time of period (even within a quarter) in deregulated markets, 
it is more meaningful to look at the profits or the costs for a certain time sequence. 
The practice of buy-back program also exists in other industries over the world. We 
may study the buy-back practice of other industries like aluminum smelters to see 
how the models vary. Meanwhile, similar concepts of demand postponement 
management are worth to study in other problem contexts. For instance, we may 
consider the consumption of airline or hotel capacity. When peak season is coming 
and potential capacity shortages are detected, the airline or the hotel can contact 
potential customers to give them an advance notice and suggest for different choice 
of airlines, flights or hotels. This may generate a lower cost for postponement than 
waiting until the customers show up at the service facility. For those customers who 
sign up to accept the different hotel or different flight, may be allowed to pay a lower 
price for their flexibility. This is similar to the energy buy-back program studied in 




Bl.l Overview of the Plastics Industry in Hong Kong 
Bl.1.1 Growth of Plastics Industry in Hong Kong 
Hong Kong's plastics industry commenced in the mid-1940s as a post-war low-cost 
labour-intensive cottage industry. During the first fifteen years of its development, 
the industry was mainly involved with the production of simple toys and household 
goods such as stationery, combs, tooth brushes and chopsticks for both domestic and 
export sales. The unsophisticated industry's annual export values were, however, 
insignificant. Shipments were directed mainly to neighbouring Asian markets. 
The industry began to flourish in the early 1960s as a result of a higher level of 
capital investment which contributed immensely to the diversification of plastics 
products. In addition, the combination of high productivity and access to low-cost 
raw materials gave the plastics products industry a significant export competitive 
advantage. By late 1964, local plastic manufacturers could produce high standard 
moulds for complicated and better quality plastic toys. The investment made Hong 
Kong surpassed Japan as the world's leading exporter of toys in 1972. [40] 
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Bl.1.2 Peak period (1980s) of the Plastics Industry in Hong 
Kong 
In 1982，the plastics industry was the third largest export earner in Hong Kong, 
accounting for HK$7 billion worth which was about 9% of aggregate domestic 
exports. At the end of March 1983, there were 5,259 establishments in the plastics 
industry, employing a total of 83,452 workers or about 9.8% of the total 
manufacturing workforce in Hong Kong. 
Based on the findings of the 1980 Census of Industry, the plastics industry 
contributed some 8% to the total value-added of the manufacturing sector, ranking 
plastics fourth among all industry groups after garment, textiles and electronics. Its 
contribution to overall manufacturing gross output was 6.7%, equivalent to about 
one-third of the gross output of the garment industry. Like both the garment and 
metal product industries, the plastics industry hired quite a large number of workers 
to perform simple operations relating to the finishing processes. In 1980，labour 
coast accounted for 56% of the value-added of the industry and some 22% of the 
gross output. Payment to workers accounted for 6% of the labor cost of the industry. 
The cost of raw material purchases traditionally accounted for more than 60% of the 
gross output of the industry. The cost structure of the plastics industry represented a 
typical example of the structural characteristics of the manufacturing industries in 
Hong Kong - most of which are highly labour-intensive and generally price-inelastic 
in import demand. [40] 
The plastics industry was continue to grow steadily and was at the peak in 1986. In 
1986，number of establishments in plastics industry accounted for more than 10% of 
manufacturing sector in which 8.3% of person engaged in this industry. It 
contributed almost 10% to the total value-added of the manufacturing sector and 
9.28% to overall manufacturing gross output. [26] 
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Bl.1.3 Decline of the Plastics Industry in Hong Kong 
However, the industry was about to decline since 1987 due to the economic 
downturn and shrinkage of the whole manufacturing industries. From 1987 to 2000, 
the plastics industry shrank over 50% during these 14 years. According to the Hong 
Kong Census and Statistics Department, the plastics industry contributed only about 
1% to the overall manufacturing gross output while its contribution to the total 
value-added of the manufacturing sector was 1.24%. Comparing 2001 with 2000，the 
plastic industry had the most pronounced declines among all manufacturing 
industries, which accounted for 44% of decreases in value added. Number of 
establishments and persons engaged also had significant decrease, accounted for 
5.1% and 2.2% of the manufacturing sector respectively. [26] 
Table B l . l shows the up and down of plastics industry in Hong Kong from year 
1980 to year 2001. 
Table B l . l : Trends of Plastics Industry in Hong Kong from Year 1980-2001 
~ ~ Number of Purchases Sales of 〜时 o"一 Contribution to Year 二 二 persons of Materials Goods �二 ： t ^^e Economy  Establishments 日叩即ed ($ Million) ($ Million) ($ Million) (�石、 
1980 5,092 85,595 4,781 7,765 7,809 7 
1981 5,133 ~ 91,303 5,707 “ 9,271 — 9,351 7 
1982 — 4,834 “ 82,895 5,489 “ 9,061 — 9,098 “ 7 
1983 4,466 “ 82,083 7,928 11,765 ~ 11,915 “ 7 
1984 4,985 ~ 88,923 10,901 17,579 — 16,864 “ 9 
1985 ~ 5,213 86,908 9,624 16,834 ~ 15,713 “ 9 
1986 “ 5.101 — 94,109 13,454 22,601 21,094 “ 9 
1987 - 5,409 89,288 15,695 27,331 23,778 “ 8 
1988 5,566 74,483 16,389 28,760 — 24,966 “ 8 
1989 - 5,281 63,999 15,869 28,928 24,795 “ 8 
1990 4,762 49,716 11,345 26,582 19,204 “ 6 
1991 3,795 38,725 9,377 22,731 — 16,318 “ 6 
1992 3,511 _ 32,608 9,190 21,773 15,865 “ 6 
1993 - 2,374 “ 22,465 5,921 17,900 — 11,026 6 
1994 2,041 15,503 5,031 11,946 — 8,460 5 
1995 _ 1,653 11,505 5,041 10,971 8,253 “ 6 
1996 - 1,552 - 10,877 3,727 9,000 6,831 “ 4 一 
1997 - 1,539 ~ 9,465 3,459 8,532 — 6,425 _ 4 ~ ~ 
1998 1,363 一 8,658— 2,236 — 5,783 ~ 4,683 3 
1999 _ 1,147 — 7,073 1,922 4,615 3,717 “ 3 — 
2000 1,056 — 6,490 — 1,973 一 4,557 — 3,808 3 
2001 881 4,353 1,212 2,944 2,264 2  
{Source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department) 
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B1.2 Literature Review 
Bl.2.1 History of Plastics 
The history of plastics has more than 100 years - however, compared to other 
materials, plastics are relatively new. 
The 1900s 
The early 1900s saw the development of cellulose acetate to get around this problem. 
This was widely used as safety film to stiffen and waterproof the fabric wings and 
fuselage of early airplanes. 
The 1920s 
The 20s produced the first moldable light-colored plastic, made by combining 
carbon dioxide and ammonia with formaldehyde. The resulting product, urea 
formaldehyde, could be used to great visual effect and was highly popular in making 
tableware. By adding colored powder to the white mixture, it was possible to 
produce patterns which looked like marble, alabaster or stone, so for the first time, 
plastics were not just a functional choice, but also an aesthetic one. These urea resins 
also found important industrial applications in varnishes, laminates and adhesives. 
The 1940s 
World War II meant a huge boost for plastics. As a domestically generated resource 
which had by this time become relatively cheap, plastic was able to take over from 
imported materials. In terms of design technology, consumer products benefited 
from the new techniques which had been developed out of necessity during the war. 
The 1960s 
In a decade renowned for its emphasis on style and fashion, the fact that plastics had 
become highly developed was a huge advantage. This led to the introduction of a 
range of innovative new products in the fashion world, including soft and hard foams 
with a protective skin, wet-look polyurethane and transparent acrylic. 
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The explosion in global communications during the 80s and 90s has been made 
largely possible through the use of plastics. Equipment such as computers, fiber 
optic cables and telephones all use plastics widely in their design to provide strength, 
lightweight, insulation and flexibility. 
Plastics became so highly developed that they could not only imitate but also in 
some cases exceed the performance of the real thing. For example PVC which looks 
like leather, and solid surfaces which imitate granite or marble are now available. 
[28] 
B 1.2.2 Plastics in General 
Plastics are polymers. Most commercially used plastics are synthetic polymers, but 
they can also be made of biopolymers. Polymers are formed by chemical reactions in 
which a large number of monomers are linked in a chain. In many polymers only one 
type of monomer is present, but it is also possible that two or three different 
monomers are present. The size and structure of the polymer molecule determines 
the properties of the plastic material, allowing huge variety and versatility. [29] 
Plastics are one of the most resource efficient and versatile materials available to 
society. They make a significant contribution to the vital goals of sustainable 
development. For example: plastics provide affordable products giving more people 
access to higher standards of living, healthcare and information. Besides, plastics 
help save resources - fossil fuels and energy. After serving a useful purpose, 
plastics can either be recycled or used as an alternative fuel. Plastic waste has a 
calorific value at least equal to coal and with lower CO2 emissions. 
Nowadays, no other material can compete with plastics when it comes to meeting 
technological demands while preserving resources. One of the important uses of 
plastics is packaging, without plastics packaging, the weight of packaging would 
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increase four-fold, production costs and energy consumption would be doubled, and 
waste volume increased by 150%. [25] 
B 1.2.3 Environmental, Safety and Health Issues of Plastics 
Production and Disposal 
In many countries, more strict regulations are in the pipeline to control the plastics 
production processes. For example, Shenzhen has imposed more stringent measures 
on companies which import waste materials, including waste plastics, for recycling. 
In another development, many manufacturers have begun to review their production 
facilities and processes in order to comply with such regulations. 
The EU has adopted an emergency ban since 7 December 1999 on the use of 
phthalates in certain soft PVC toys and childcare articles on an EU-wide basis. The 
ban covers the use of the six phthalates in toys and childcare articles for under-threes 
placed on Member States' markets. In Japan, some toys for infants are subject to 
Food Sanitation Law which governs the use of toxic materials in the making of toys, 
in particular, the toxic impurities contained in plastic toys. 
In response to the growing concern about environmental protection and the more 
stringent regulations in this respect, degradable and recyclable plastics are in 
demand; particularly biodegradable plastics are preferred as UV-degradable plastics 
become difficult to degrade after disposal at landfills. 
Meanwhile, there is growing concern about product safety and health impacts of 
consumer goods in major markets. For example, in Western Europe, there are a lot of 
debates on the likely harmful effects of plastic toys and health-care products to kids 
and babies. It follows those plastic raw materials without harmful additives and 
substances are preferred for the production of final consumer goods. [34] 
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Bl.2.4 Recovery and Recycling of Plastic Waste in Hong Kong 
In Hong Kong, about 214,000 tonnes of plastic waste were recovered in Hong Kong. 
This represented about 38% of the total plastic waste arising (dry weight). The 
recovered plastic waste was either recycled locally (3% or 6,600 tonnes) or exported 
to the Mainland and other countries for recycling (97% or 208,000 tonnes). 
Most Hong Kong's plastic recyclers consume only clean and homogeneous pre-
consumer plastic waste collected from the industrial sector. The plastic waste 
recycling process starts with the sorting by resin types. The plastics are rinsed to 
remove contaminants. The sorted and washed waste is then crushed and mixed with 
colourant before melting and palletizing. The pellets produced will be sold to plastic 
product manufacturers as raw material. [31] 
B1.3 Scope and Limitation 
Due to the limitation of time, it is difficult to cover all the things regarding the Hong 
Kong's plastics industry in this thesis. In the following study, we will only focus on 
the Hong Kong's plastic raw material production, thus plastic resins and resin 
compounds. We study how Hong Kong's plastic raw materials companies improve 
themselves, both in technical side and managerial side so as to cope with the fierce 
competition in the industry. Besides, almost all of the manufacturing companies 
(including plastic raw material companies) in Hong Kong move their production line 
back to South China, especially in Pearl River Delta (PRD), due to the low land and 
labour cost. It is also interested to know how Hong Kong and PRD complement and 
reinforce each other in the manufacturing supply chain. We will use a case study 
approach to conduct the research. 
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B1.4 Motivation 
Plastics industry has been one of the pillars of Hong Kong economy in 1980s. It 
contributed to Hong Kong lots during the past decades. Not only the large amount of 
external trade but also the significant value added to the society. It employs well 
over 90,000 people and generates gross output in excess of HK$20 billion in 1986, 
the peak period of the plastics industry. [26] 
Now, the plastics industry is declining continuously due to the transforming of 
industry sector from manufacturing to services. Almost all the operation processes, 
which include research & development and production, have been moved to PRD. 
Hong Kong can only conduct front-end process, thus customers' need and back-end 
process, i.e. sales and distribution channel. [30] 
It is worth to study how Hong Kong's plastics companies equip themselves to 
encounter the shrinkage of the industry. We investigate the manufacturing supply 
chain between Hong Kong and PRD and advise how they can complement each 
other. The potential weakness and threat of the industry are worth to study as well so 
that the industry can find a way not only to survive but also bounce back. 
B1.5 Organization of Thesis Part B 
This part has four chapters. Chapter B1 is a general overview of Hong Kong's 
plastics Industry and a brief introduction of plastics related issues. We also define 
the scope of study in this Chapter. Chapter B2 presents the research methodology 
adopted for the study as well as an overview of Hong Kong's plastics raw material 
industry. In this Chapter, we make three propositions to address the objectives of the 
study. Chapter B3 describes the details of the case study. Besides, findings and 
analysis of the case are presented in this Chapter as well. Last but not least, 




In this Chapter, we will look at the research methodology which was adopted in this 
study. Besides, three propositions will be made in order to better support our study 
and open for further discussion. As we have developed the scope of the study in 
previous Chapter - to focus on the Hong Kong's plastic raw material production, an 
overview of Hong Kong's plastics raw material industry will be discussed in this 
Chapter as well. 
B2.1 Research Design 
We use case study approach to conduct this research, which can be divided into two 
phases. The initial phase is the secondary data research through government 
publications and reviews of related web sites. Data and information are also gathered 
from newspapers. Following the extensive secondary data research, a comprehensive 
literature reviews on various issues of plastics is carried out. We can form an idea of 
the history and latest development of the plastics industry during this stage. We also 
set the scope of study by reviewing the secondary data. This is done because we 
would like to better focus on the research problems during the second phase of the 
study. 
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The second phase of the study is in-depth understanding of a Hong Kong's plastics 
raw material company. A brief introduction of the company will be described in 
Chapter B3. In this summer, we had a chance to work for the company for a month. 
During this period, we know not only the daily operations and manufacturing supply 
chain of a typical plastics raw material company but also the prospect and 
opportunity of the industry. This working experience is worthy since it lets us 
understand the actual face of the industry, which is unable to get from secondary 
data. This stage serves as a concrete support of the whole study. 
B2.2 Propositions 
Indeed, plastics industry in Hong Kong underwent great changes in the past decades. 
It has been the first five manufacturing industries in Hong Kong and has contributed 
to Hong Kong's economy a lot. Now, as the transforming of the economic, this 
industry is no longer as prosperous as before. However, there is a different story for 
the plastics raw material industry. 
As Hong Kong is a major world supplier of toys, shoes, packaging, housewares, 
fiber optic cables and casings of electronic consumer goods (even though most Hong 
Kong firms have set up offshore manufacturing operation on Southern China), and 
the demand for plastics raw material i.e. resins and resin compound will be 
substantial. According to the Hong Kong Plastic Material Suppliers Association, 
China's auto industry urgently requires large quantities of plastics products. The 
demand for engineering plastics and specialized plastics should increase 
substantially due to the rapid development of China's automotive sector, for both 
parts and after-market parts. [39] 
We believe that every industry does have its own strength, weakness, opportunity 
and threat. If we can understand the strength and weakness; grasp the opportunity 
and get rid of the threat, the industry will be able to increase the market share. 
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For example, as the technological advancement which improves the properties of 
plastics and widens its application in various sectors, the demand for plastic raw 
materials can increase. Especially in the Chinese mainland where more outsourcing 
production activities are taken place, the demand can be obvious. [34] 
In order to better the support the study, the following three propositions are made: 
Proposition B2.1: 
Hong Kong and PRD complement each other in the plastic raw material 
manufacturing supply chain. 
Proposition B2.2: 
High technology improves the product quality and reduces costing in the plastics raw 
material industry. 
Proposition B2.3\ 
The introduction of management system complying with the international 
environment standards satisfies the environment concerns raised by the public. 
B2.3 Overview of the Plastics Raw Material Industry 
in Hong Kong 
Hong Kong's plastic raw materials companies mainly trade plastic resins and resin 
compounds. The majority of local plastic raw materials manufacturers only engage 
in processing and compounding. They are usually small establishments that convert 
plastic resins into resin compounds by colouring and plasticizing. The industry is 
characterised by a heavy reliance on imported plastic resins. Domestic production 
supplies only 20% of local demand. Total imports of plastic materials in 2002 were 
USD6.3 billion, a 12 % increase from 2001. The major suppliers of plastic resins are 
Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and the U.S. 
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The major trading items are polymers of styrene (PS), including general-purpose 
polystyrene (GPPS) and high impact polystyrene (HIPS). Also of significant share 
include resins of low-density polymers of ethylene (LDPE), high-density polymers 
of ethylene (HDPE), polymers of vinyl chloride (PVC), resins of acrylonitrile 
butadiene styrene (ABS), polycarbonates (PC), polypropylene (PP), polyethylene 
terethalate (PET), and nylon. 
The success of Hong Kong's plastic raw materials industry lies in quick response to 
the fast-changing market. Hong Kong companies are well known for their short 
delivery lead-time and flexibility in dealing with small orders and meeting 
customers' specifications. Quite a large number of plastic raw materials 
manufacturers have moved their production facilities to the Chinese mainland and 
Southeast Asian countries, alongside their customers who have moved their 
production sites to these countries. 
Hong Kong's exports of plastic raw materials achieved a 10% growth in value in 
2002 due to a surge in oil prices that in turn raised the price of petrochemical 
products, such as polymers and other plastics. The export growth was also attributed 
to the continual outsourcing trend of production to the Chinese mainland which 
drove up the demand for plastic raw materials. The Chinese mainland is a 
manufacturing centre of various semi-finished and finished goods which consume a 
significant amount of plastic raw materials during the production process, such as 
toys, household electrical appliances, household goods, etc. Exports to the Chinese 
mainland increased by 11% and took up 96% of total exports in 2002. The major 
exports of Hong Kong are PS, which made up 33% of total exports in 2002. PS is a 
major plastic raw material for producing electronic parts, toys, household goods, etc. 
In fact, many leading chemical manufacturers have already set up joint ventures in 
China, targeting at the higher-end segments which require large capital investments 
in research and development. Many of their products possess special features, such 
as longer durability and better resistance to heat, high impact, acidic erosion and 
other chemical reactions. They are suitable for making auto-parts, household 
electrical appliances (e.g. hair dryers, parts of microwave oven, toaster, etc.) and 
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other high-tech products including portable computers, mobile phones and higher-
end audio systems. 
Facing intensifying competition from indigenous Chinese companies and plastics 
suppliers in the region, including Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and the US, some 
Hong Kong manufacturers are shifting to the high-end sector. Some products are 
made in accordance to the specific requirements of each of the customers' final 
product. Samples are provided for clients' repetitive testing to ensure that a more 
suitable and cost-effective solution is being offered. The large capital investment in 
machinery and research and development can be offset by the higher gross profit 
margin from the sale of the high-end plastic raw materials. 
Demand for plastic raw materials is expected to grow due to its improving qualities 
and functionality. In fact, plastics are widely used in an array of industries, such as 
PE agricultural films and the building sector, apart from making plastic consumer 
goods. Plastic building materials are described as the fourth generation of shaped 
building materials after steel, timber and cement. They include mainly plastic pipe, 
window and door, and waterproofing material, heat-insulating material, decoration 
and fittings materials. Plastic drainage pipe is widely used in construction. The 
market share of plastic pipe and window and door is estimated to have significant 
growth in future. It is expected that demand for resins in the automotive industry 
would increase due to the development of low weight plastics and improvements in 
their durability. [34] 
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Chapter B3 
Findings and Analysis 
In this Chapter, we will introduce the case of our study. The background of the 
company - Wofoo Plastics Ltd., product and services provided and the 
manufacturing process will be addressed. We then further elaborate three 
propositions made in the previous Chapter by using this company. List of acronymic 
terms mentioned in Part B of this thesis can be found in Appendix B. 
B3.1 Introduction of the Case Study 
B3.1.1 Wofoo Plastics Limited (WPL) 
Engaged in PVC compound production since the 1980，WPL is currently one of the 
largest manufacturer of PVC compounds in Hong Kong. Moreover, WPL also 
involves in trading of PVC Resin and plasticizer. Exemplifying WPL's achievement 
in product quality and services standard, WPL was certified as the first IS09002 
PVC compound manufacturer in Hong Kong in 1995. [32] 
WPL maintains a 3000 square meter office in Hong Kong, with over 4000 square 
meters of storage capacity and over 8000 tons (liquid cargo) of barge capacity. With 
an expanding operation, WPL strengthens its position in the Mainland China Market, 
and has consequently set up manufacturing plants in Shenzhen and Ningbo to step up 
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the production capacity and diversify the range of products. WPL has four 
manufacturing facilities in the Mainland China, three located in the Shenzhen and 
one in Ningbo. They are Marlins Plastics (Shenzhen) Co. Ltd., New Mega Plastics 
(Shenzhen) Co. Ltd. Fauchon Plastics (Shenzhen) Co. Ltd. and Wellecon (Ning Bo) 
Plastic Industrial Co. Ltd. [41] 
The Chairman of WPL is Mr. Joseph Lee who graduated from Illinois Institute of 
Technology (IIT) in Business Administration in 1972. He returned to Hong Kong, 
worked in the plastics industry and found WPL in 1980. Under the leadership of the 
Group Chairman Mr. Joseph Lee, currently serving his second continuous term as 
Deputy of the Hong Kong SAR of the Tenth National People's Congress of the PRC, 
WPL has upheld the principle to be "Based on Quality, Built on Care". 
As understanding and responding to customers' needs is an important business in a 
company now, WPL surveys market intelligence and studies latest technological 
developments in the businesses. Through continuously upgrading the machinery and 
production technology, WPL would like to better serve its customers by optimizing 
resource utilization and minimizing production time. [41] 
B3.1.2 Products and Services provided by WPL 
WPL produces a wide range of PVC compounds and PVC products for various 
industrial and technical applications. WPL's PVC compounds are suitable for various 
product manufacturing such as toys, bottling, footwear and insulation and jacketing 
materials for cables and wires. Other products include PVC pipes & profiles 
designed according to customer specifications and standards with applications for 
drainage, electrical wire conduit, electrical cable conduit and many other industrial 
and commercial applications. WPL supplies PVC compounds under its own label, 
"Wofoo," to renowned toy and wiring manufacturers that export to European and 
American, and Japan markets. [41] 
To summarize, the products and services include the following: 
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PVC Compounds 
Production of PVC compounds which are suitable for all kinds of PVC products, 
together with technical support to meet the customer's requirement. 
PVC Raw Materials 
Distribution of various kinds of PVC resins, plasticizers, stabilizers, providing 
relevant services and technical support, to satisfy customers' need, including tailor-
made formulation for rotational molding. 
Pipes, Fittinss and Profile 
WPL has assembled several production facilities in Shenzhen and Ningbo, for the 
production of different kinds of pipes and fittings. [33] 
B3.1.3 Manufacturing Process 
PVC resin, which is inherently hard and brittle, must be mixed with other additives 
to make a compound before it can be processed into useful products. Numerous 
additives are available to allow PVC resin to be modified for a wide range of 
applications. Adding plasticizers makes PVC compounds soft and flexible, whereas 
adding impact modifiers creates PVC compounds that are tough and impact-
resistant. Adding different combination of pigments makes PVC compounds 
colourful and widens the applications of the plastics. 
The initial step in producing PVC compounds is called dry blending. Dry blending 
takes place in a closed vessel, where dry and liquid additives are mixed together by 
blades or paddles. Because the resin particles are porous, the liquid additives are 
absorbed relatively easily, yielding a dry powder compound similar in appearance to 
the original resin. For some applications such as pipe and siding, these powder 
compounds can subsequently be processed directly into the final product. 
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For other applications - such as wire & cable, rigid profiles for vertical blinds, or 
injection-moulded parts for computers or appliances - additional processing may be 
necessary. In this case, powder compounds are mixed, melted, and then formed into 
small pellets or cubes. This step can improve the compounds' performance at the 
customer and ensures the final product meets stringent end-use requirements. [37] 
Figure B3.1 visualizes the manufacturing of PVC Compound process. [36] 
Figure B3.1: Manufacturing of PVC Compound Process [36] 
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B3.1.4 Business Process 
WPL's Hong Kong office focuses on the front-end and back-end process while the 
Shenzhen's factories do the operation process. Front-end process includes understand 
customers' need and back-end process are sales and distribution channels as Hong 
Kong has an extensive network of distribution channels and global logistics. On the 
other hand, Shenzhen, with its advantages of lower land and labour cost, 
concentrates on the operation process which includes the whole production and 
technology development. Figure B3.2 shows the business process of WPL. 
Figure B3.2: Business Process [30] 
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B3.2 Proposition B2.1: Hong Kong and PRD 
complement each other in the plastic raw 
material manufacturing supply chain. 
Hong Kong has transformed from a manufacturing economy in 1950s to a service 
economy in the 1990s although the manufacturing sector of the past was 
predominantly made up of small and medium-sized enterprises that compete 
globally. Hong Kong's major strengths have been in services such as law, accounting 
and finance but not engineering and technical skills while PRD has its low-cost 
attractiveness and high technology development. 
Indeed, PRD should focus on high technology production since it has a larger 
availability of land for the set up of production plants and better-developed 
infrastructure for high technology manufacturing. Besides, PRD has a large pool of 
technically trained human resources, who hail from all parts of China. It is also the 
competitive edge of PRD to concentrate its efforts on research and development. 
On the other hand, Hong Kong should offer its expertise in the service-related part of 
the plastic raw material manufacturing supply chain. They are the front-end services 
of sourcing, purchase and marketing and back-end service of logistics. Particularly in 
the area of logistics, which Hong Kong's well-developed infrastructure and 
communication systems should be well used. [30] 
We believed that both Hong Kong and PRD have their own advantages in different 
areas to develop the industry. However, companies should find a way to optimize the 
ultimate output and prevent from duplicating the work. It can be done by integrating 
the different styles of culture, understanding and complying with government policy 
and attracting talent from all over the world. As the potential geographical and 
political issues, there is a bottleneck i.e. customs clearance between Hong Kong and 
PRD. We see that it will be solved by developing common transport infrastructure in 
the near future. Then the flow of goods and people will be more easy and 
convenient. This ultimately leads to a stronger linkage between two places. 
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B3.3 Proposition B2.2: High technology improves the 
product quality and reduces costing in the 
plastics raw material industry. 
The industry should not neglect to invest in research and development section and 
other departments like production and administration section have to co-operate 
substantially so that the research process runs in the most efficient way and the 
results have the largest return. Since the industry involves largely in chemical 
technology and the advancements can improve the properties of plastics and widen 
the application in various sectors. 
General testing of plastics' properties include their flammability, ignition resistance, 
tracking resistance, electrical properties, mechanical properties, thermal properties, 
retention of properties upon exposure to UV/water and retention of property at 
elevated temperature. New inventions of additives like stabilizers, plasticizers, and 
colourants may satisfy any particular needs of the above properties by customers. [38] 
In order to minimise the costing, it is necessary to replace high-cost additives by 
low-cost additives with the similar properties after accurate testing. It takes time and 
capital to do the research and testing since the company needs to liaize with various 
suppliers to get the sample, most of the testing process may fail and the company's 
resources then reduce relatively. However, it is worth to do and the return is long-
term. 
Since chemical reaction is sensitive to changes like temperature, pressure and time of 
adding material, changes of production process can improve the plastics quality as 
well as reduce time and costing. Replacement and immediate maintenance of 
machinery can surely increase productivity. All of them need investment but if the 
industry does not do so, they cannot cope with the intensive competition in the 
market. Last but no least, the management should make sure that all the 
improvements are on the right track and the operation level has to follow the new 
way or procedure. 
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B3.4 Proposition B2.3: The introduction of 
management system complying with the 
international environment standards satisfies the 
environment concerns raised by the public. 
Environmental protection has increasingly affected the production and processing of 
plastic raw materials. In many countries, more stringent regulations are in the 
progress to control the production processes. For example, Shenzhen has imposed 
more stringent measures on companies which import waste materials, including 
waste plastics, for recycling. In another development, many manufacturers have 
begun to review their production facilities and processes in order to comply with 
such regulations. The introduction of management system complying with the 
international environment standards, notably the ISO 14000，is likely to satisfy the 
environment concerns raised by the government and the public. 
According to the Hong Kong Productivity Council, more and more Hong Kong's 
companies with their factories in South China are going to develop environment 
management system and be certified ISO 14000 so as to comply with the regulation 
and the requirement of customers and suppliers. The ISO 14000 series of 
international standards have been developed for incorporating environmental aspects 
into operations and product standards. 
The ISO 14000 requires implementation of an Environmental Management System 
(EMS) in accordance with defined internationally recognized standards. The 
ISO 14000 standard specifies requirements for establishing an environmental policy, 
determining environmental aspects & impacts of products/activities/services, 
planning environmental objectives and measurable targets, implementation & 
operation of programs to meet objectives & targets, checking & corrective action, 
and management review. [35] 
Management level of the company recognizes the importance of environmental 
concerns during implementing EMS. Detailed planning and control measures are 
operated and so that the operation level of the company can follows the rules. The 
entire procedure of plastic production and waste disposal, especially those dangerous 
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and hazard chemicals are standardized and under-controlled. This implementation 




In the study, we understand the development and current status of plastics industry in 
Hong Kong. Most importantly, the working experiences in a plastic raw material 
manufacturing company let us know how to produce the product efficiently and cost-
effectively. Indeed, it is uneasy to do a business, especially manufacturing industry. 
Whether or not the business becomes success depends on many crucial factors which 
cannot be independently counted. Those factors are mutually related and 
complement each other. Some of the crucial factors include: 
• enough capital for both set-up and continuous investment; 
• talented human resources for making tactical decision, managing the operation 
team well; 
• low-cost space and stable supply of utilities (e.g. electricity and water) for setting 
up the production plants; 
• reasonable government policy and tax systems for optimizing the profits; 
• clear company objectives and directions. 
Plastic is a substance that cannot be replaced cost-effectively in this era. Apart from 
making plastic consumer goods like toys, living, decoration, medical, building, 
engineering depend on plastics very much. Moreover, the qualities and functionality 
of plastics improve continuously. Demand for plastic raw materials is therefore 
expected to grow. Particularly, plastic building materials are described as the fourth 
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generation of shaped building materials after steel, timber and cement. They include 
mainly plastic pipe, window and door, and waterproofing material, heat-insulating 
material, decoration and fittings materials. 
That means, there do have demand but the competition in the industry is expected to 
be more and more fierce. Plastics raw material companies should strive for reduce 
costing and improve product quality to satisfy customer's need and increase profit 
margin. In our study, we look at the industry from the managerial point of view but 
the improvements are not easy tasks since it involves both internal and external 
improvements. For the internal improvements, companies should develop process re-
engineering. For the external improvements, it involves government of two places 
and the different rooted-culture between two places. However, we believe that most 
of aggressive companies are undergoing the internal improvement procedure in order 
to face and deal with the real and immediate challenges. 
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Appendix A 
Extract from Holmes, S., L. Hyde and M. H. Rothkopf. ''Auctions and Their Use in 
Natural Gas Markets”. Office of Economic Policy Paper 98-09, October 1998. 
Background on Auctions 
An auction is one form of market institution for allocating goods and services. It is 
an organized market with explicit rules known to the participants for making bids 
and/or offers to buy and/or sell, to determine prices, and to allocate goods and 
services to winning bidders. 
Auctions are commonly used to sell a number of items or services such as fine 
collectibles, stocks and bonds, agricultural commodities, timber, oil/gas/mineral 
leases, communications spectra, and estates. When bidders in an auction are bidding 
to buy items or services, the auction is known as a demand or demand-side auction. 
When bidders are bidding to determine who will supply or sell items or services, as 
is the case in bidding for some government contracts, the auction is known as a 
supply or supply-side auction. Further, some auctions, known as double auctions, 
have both buyers and sellers bidding within the same auction. Examples are stock 
exchanges and commodity futures exchanges. 
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Value of Auctions 
Auctions are only one of many ways that goods and services can be allocated. Two 
other ways are through negotiation and the use of posted prices. Why then are 
auctions sometimes preferred over other forms of allocating goods and services? 
There are four major reasons: 
• Unknown Worth. Auctions are useful when the value of an item/service is not 
well known. The value may be highly uncertain either because the item or service is 
unique (such as with a rare antique), or because there are large and frequent 
fluctuations in supply, demand, and thus price (such as in gas or gas transportation). 
• Fairness. Properly structured auctions (e.g., ones with rules to prevent 
favoritism) are fair because all bidders have an equal opportunity to buy the item 
being sold and/or sellers have an equal opportunity to sell. Moreover, properly 
designed auctions are perceived to be fair when they are transparent, and thus let 
bidders see the processes by which the results were reached much more clearly than 
with private transactions. 
• Limit Price Discrimination. One aspect of perceived fairness relates to the prices 
at which trades occur. An auction provides a way to limit price discrimination, 
which occurs when buyers do not face the same prices (or sellers do not receive the 
same per-unit revenues) and the price differences are not related to costs. 
Regulatory authorities may be especially interested in requiring auctions as a way to 
reduce or avoid price discrimination by the entities they regulate. 
• Efficiency. Auctions can affect efficiency by helping allocate goods and services 
to the highest valued consumers and production to the lowest cost suppliers. In a 
well-designed demand auction, items tend to be allocated to those who value them 
most. A well-designed supply auction tends to select the lowest cost suppliers for a 
specified quality. This efficiency effect can be pronounced when compared with 
nonmarket mechanisms for allocation. Auctions tend to work well in simple 
situations. In more complicated situations, negotiations may work as well or better. 
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Other Considerations in Auction Design 
In choosing a specific type of auction, several other considerations may affect the 
design choice. These additional considerations include market power, costs to run 
the auction, transactions costs, risk, and speed with which the auction can occur. 
The auction designer may need to choose among, or to make compromises between, 
some of the goals. 
Market Power. When a regulatory authority requires an auction by regulated 
entities, one of its goals may be to limit or eliminate any exercise of market power 
by those entities. 
Costs of Running the Auction. The costs of running the auction need to be 
considered. Electronic auctions can sometimes be more expensive to set up, but are 
likely to be less expensive to run than those with human auctioneers and/or less 
efficient technology. Complex decision rules may also involve more development 
costs, but may pay off in greater efficiency. 
Transactions Costs of Bidders. Auctions can either raise or lower transactions costs 
or the costs of doing business. Where buyers and sellers have trouble finding each 
other, an established auction procedure may lower the parties' search costs and may 
be a primary reason for adopting the auction. However, some auction formats may 
involve more transactions costs than others, or even higher transactions costs than no 
auction at all. 
Risk. Choices made in structuring an auction often have implications for the risks 
that parties bear. This risk can take several forms. It could include the risk that the 
bidder leaves money on the table (pays more than necessary to beat the next highest 
bidder), or the risk that the bid is unsuccessful. There may be the additional risk of 
not acquiring related items, if the items are split among multiple auctions. For 
example, if capacity releases were all auctioned separately and simultaneously, a 
8 1 
bidder might end up getting either no capacity or too much capacity. Likewise, with 
some auctions, bidders may be exposed to the risk that they get capacity but not the 
gas, or vice versa. In a well-structured auction, it is important to balance costs and 
rewards for bearing risk among the parties. While eliminating unnecessary risk is 
good, it is also important to balance risk which can be eliminated from the auction 
against the other goals of auction design. 
Speed. In some cases, it may be important for an auction to be finished quickly. 
This is particularly true when the availability of or demand for the item being 
auctioned is short-lived or highly variable, and unpredictably so. Auctions for daily 
or shorter-term transportation service fall into this category. The need for a quick 
auction may make some forms of auctions inappropriate. This is more likely to be an 
issue where there are extended rounds of an auction, or when the decision rules are 
complex. Less complex rules may be quicker and have lower transactions costs, but 
otherwise lead to a less efficient outcome. 
Choices in Auction Design 
A number of choices must be made in designing any auction. These design choices 
are important because different rules and procedures can result in different incentives 
for buyers and sellers. These incentives, in turn, can influence whether or not 
particular desired outcomes from an auction can be achieved. 
The auction literature sometimes focuses on major types of auctions, such as 
English, Dutch, first-price, or second-price. However trying to capture all of the 
rules, procedures, and characteristics of a particular auction with only a single word 
or phrase may be confusing or impossible because: 
• Most auctions will have more than one important rule or procedure 
• Different authors may be implying different rules and procedures when using the 
same name or term for a type of auction 
• There may be more than one name for a specific rule or procedure. 
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As a result we use terms like "first-price" or "single round" to indicate only that a 
particular rule or procedure is being discussed. We also identify other terms that 
have been used to describe the same rule or procedure. Finally, we discuss these 
rules and procedures in terms of choices to be made in auction design, rather than as 
types of auctions. 
Eight important choices in auction design include: 
• How frequently should repeated auctions be held? 
• How should multiple related items be sold (bought)? 
• Who may bid? 
• Do some bidders get special treatment? 
• Should bidders have multiple opportunities to submit bids? 
• How should the price move during the auction? 
“ W h a t information is revealed to bidders? 
• What price(s) is/are paid by the winning bidder(s)? 
How Frequently Should Repeated Auctions Be Held? 
When items are available on an on-going or recurring basis, it is important to decide 
on auction frequency. Should items be auctioned as they come available, or held 
temporarily for less frequent larger sales? There are both advantages and 
disadvantages of frequent sales. They may cost more. However, more frequent 
auctions may be especially beneficial when the value, need for, or volume of the 
item(s) cannot be predicted well in advance, or are especially volatile. The more 
often the needs and values change, the greater the need for frequent auctions. 
How Should Multiple Related Items Be Sold (Bought)? 
Auctions are sometimes used for multiple related items or services. The items may 
be related in a number of ways. The items may be identical (homogeneous). They 
may be differentiated only slightly and be good substitutes for each other. Or, they 
may be complementary or useful together. Some items may be more complementary 
to, or more substitutable for, than others to be sold (or acquired). In an extreme case, 
some items/services may be worthless without other specific items/services. Related 
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items can be sold either sequentially or simultaneously. Each approach has its 
benefits. 
Sequentially. With sequential auctions, each related item is offered separately. This 
is the least complex way to sell related items. When items are perfect or near perfect 
substitutes, they may sell for different prices in each of the separate auctions. As a 
result，the auction may not be seen to be fair. When items are less perfect substitutes 
or are complements, other problems may be encountered. A sequential format may 
not meet customers' needs when customers have a preferred combination of the 
items. Bidders wanting a package of items or services must acquire each separately, 
and will not know until the auctions are completed whether they have acquired the 
necessary combination of items/services to match their needs. 
Simultaneously. In simultaneous auctions, bidders bid on multiple items at once. If 
the items are fungible (like Treasury bills), the bids may be for any of the items. If 
the items are different, then bids will normally be for specific items. The auction 
may sell the items completely independently, or it may allow bidders some freedom 
to bid on combinations of items or to limit their total expenditures. When items tend 
to be substitutes for each other, the bidders may want to limit their total expenditures 
or the number of items that they win. Otherwise, they risk winning too many or too 
few. If the items are complements, bidders will want to be able to bid on 
combinations. However, allowing bids on combinations complicates the auction. It 
may even make the problem of determining the best (i.e., revenue maximizing) set of 
bids mathematically difficult. The bidders need to limit total expenditures or to bid 
on combinations may be somewhat mitigated if the simultaneous auction is 
conducted in a series of progressive rounds. In such an auction, the bidders can limit 
their total expenditures, and they may be able to discern from the bidding something 
about which combinations they are likely to be able to win. 
When bidders must bid simultaneously, items may be misallocated or a bidder may 
win too many or too few items. The importance of these possibilities depends, in 
part, on the nature of the post auction market in the items auctioned. If there is an 
after market in which the items can be freely and easily traded, these possibilities are 
of much less significance than if the items cannot be traded or if the after market is 
slow and burdensome. 
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Who May Bid? 
Single Sided or Double Auction. Some auctions are single sided and involve either 
demand bidding or supply bidding. Double auctions have bidding occurring on both 
the demand and the supply sides. 
Bidder Qualification. It is important to determine carefully the necessary 
qualifications for auction participation. Sometimes, this requires a balancing of 
opposing concerns. If the auction is open too broadly, bidders who are financially 
irresponsible may affect the auction results. They may win and then default. Also, if 
quality is hard to specify completely (as, for example, in bidding for the construction 
of a complicated chemical plant), the bid taker may well want to limit participation 
to bidders in the quality of whose workmanship it has confidence. On the other 
hand, the bid-taker may be better off with a high level of participation. Controlling 
participation too tightly may defeat efficiency by excluding the bidder with the 
highest value or lowest cost. If the bidder with the second best value or cost is 
excluded, the price will be changed to the bid-taker's disadvantage. Furthermore, 
limiting participation may destroy the auction's ability to produce a result that is 
regarded as fair or may allow the exercise of market power by the remaining bidders. 
Do Some Bidders Get Special Treatment? 
Sometimes an auction gives special rights to one or more bidders. For example, one 
bidder may be given the right to match (or top by a given percentage) the final bid by 
any other bidder. Rights like these are sometimes used in manuscript auctions. In 
such a sale, a seller may approach a particular publisher and offer it the right to top 
any other bid by a certain amount, say 5 percent, in return for a large initial bid. In 
natural gas transportation, the right of first refusal is a "topping right." Such topping 
rights can be quite valuable. Thus, giving certain bidders special treatment can raise 
fairness issues. Special treatment can also be used to help offset the effects of past 
unfairness. 
Should Bidders Have Multiple Opportunities to Submit Bids? 
Single Round. With a single round, bidders can submit only one bid before the 
auction concludes. The single round format is usually associated with sealed bids 
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(where bidders do not see the bids of others). Otherwise, each bidder may wait until 
the last minute to bid and try to be the last and highest bidder. The single round 
format can be used with either a first-price or second-price auction format. 
Iterative. In an iterative round format, bidders have the opportunity to bid more than 
once and thereby respond to prior bids by other bidders. The term "iterative round" 
usually means that there are discrete multiple rounds, with each bidder being allowed 
to bid once in each round. Iterative bidding formats may require "activity rules" and 
"stopping rules" to keep the auction from dragging on.8 When a short turnaround 
time is needed, the stopping rule may need to be severe. This severity can offset 
some of the advantages of allowing repeated bids. 
Continuous Bidding. Just as in an iterative round format, bidders in a continuous 
bidding format have the opportunity to bid more than once and thereby respond to 
prior bids by other bidders. However, with continuous bidding there are no discrete 
rounds, and bidders can bid at any time until the auction ends, usually when there is 
only one bidder left. Continuous bidding formats may also cause an auction to drag 
on. 
How Should the Price Move During the Auction? 
The direction of price movement within an auction is often preset. Only sealed bid, 
single round auctions will not have a predictable pattern of price movement. 
Generally, single sided auctions will be either progressive or descending in nature. In 
double auctions, the price movement generally may be either up or down, but will be 
towards a market clearing level. 
Progressive. In a demand side progressive auction, the price is successively raised by 
an auctioneer or in some other way until only one-bidder (the winning bidder) 
remains. This format is also known as an ascending or ascending-price auction. An 
example of a progressive auction familiar to most Americans is one in which bidders 
have continuing opportunities to bid and the auctioneer calls out increasingly higher 
prices. While any demand side progressive auction may sometimes be referred to as 
an English auction, traditionally the method of bidding under the English format has 
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been oral outcry. The general use of the term English auction includes progressive 
auctions with electronic bidding or hand signal bidding. 
Descending. The auctioneer or an electronic device opens the demand auction at an 
initial high price and then successively lowers the price until a bid is made and the 
bidder thereby wins the right to the item being sold. This type of format is referred to 
as a descending price auction or a Dutch auction. With a single item and descending 
bids, the winning bidder pays the price it bids, and since bidders see no actual bid 
during the auction, they may have less understanding of how other bidders value an 
item, as compared with the ascending-price format. Bidders will have only one 
opportunity to make a bid, unless the winning bidder doesn't take all of the item 
being sold and the auction continues after the winning bidder makes its selection. 
With multiple items, multiple winning bidders, and descending bids, the rules may 
require either that the winner pay its own bid (a first price auction) or the lowest 
winning bid (a variation of a second price auction). 
Double Sided—Towards Market Clearing Price. With a double-sided auction, there 
may not be a pre-determined direction of price movement. Instead, for individual 
transactions, there are offers to sell and offers to buy. If the offers to sell are priced 
higher than offers to buy, these prices move towards each other until they meet and a 
transaction takes place. If the double auction takes place on a continuing basis, like 
at the New York Stock Exchange, the transaction prices will move up and down, 
depending on supply and demand, with each transaction defining a new market price. 
What Information About Bids Is Revealed to Bidders? 
Open Bid. With open bidding, bidders know what other bidders bid during the 
auction and sometimes know which other bidders made the bids. An open bid format 
is logically associated with either an iterative or continuous bid format, since the 
main reason for open bidding is to allow bidders to react to the bids of others. 
Sealed Bid. With sealed bidding, bidders must bid without seeing the bids of others. 
A sealed bid format can be associated with either a first-price or second-price format. 
It can also be associated with either a single round or iterative round bidding format. 
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^Vhat Price Is Paid by the Winning Bidder(s)? 
First Price. In a first-price format, each winning bidder pays the price he or she has 
bid. A first-price auction can be used with any of the above choices. It can be 
associated with progressive or descending auctions, with one or multiple 
opportunities to bid, and with open or sealed bids. 
Second-Price. Under a second-price format for a demand auction, the winning bidder 
pays a per-unit price equal to the highest rejected bid, rather than its own higher bid. 
If only one item is sold, the winning bidder pays a price equal to the second highest 
price bid (hence, the term "second-price"). This auction format is sometimes called a 
Vickrey auction, after William Vickrey who first suggested it. 
Other Choices in Auction Design 
In addition to the choices detailed above, other choices need to be made in designing 
an auction. These additional choices will also have an effect on the efficiency, and 
sometimes the fairness of the auction. Choices will need to be made on bid 
withdrawal, policies for un-honored bids, the way bids are submitted (e.g., oral, 
written, electronic, etc.), and criteria for determining the winning bid(s), among other 
things. In the case of iterative and continuous auctions, decisions will need to be 
made on activity and stopping rules. Even seemingly innocuous choices such as the 
timing of bid windows and information to be announced when bidding is completed 
will be important. Repeated experience has shown that details can be critical. 
When affiliates of the seller may be bidding in an auction, all of these choices will 
need to be examined with respect to the potential for affiliate abuse. It is important to 
ensure that affiliates or other participants aren't favored. Capacity can be 
inappropriately allocated to affiliates in a number of ways including by the seller 
limiting the bidders, tailoring the offering to its affiliate's needs, biasing the 
evaluation criteria, providing information on how to win, letting the affiliate bid last 
after seeing other bids, and awarding capacity independent of the winning bid 
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criteria. When auctions involve overlapping bids, favoritism may be even easier. It 
will also be important to ensure that affiliates cannot act as shills in the auction, 
driving up prices simply to increase their affiliated pipeline's revenue. An 
independent auctioneer may be one way to limit abuse. Such an independent 
auctioneer may allow more confidentiality of bids than would otherwise be 
advisable. This is likely to help market participants. Other rules concerning auction 
announcement, procedures, and post-auction revelation of bids may also be 
necessary to prevent affiliate favoritism. 
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Appendix B 
List of acronymic terms in Part B of Thesis 
Abbreviation Meaning 
ABS Acrylonitrile Butadiene Styrene 
C 0 2 Carbon Dioxide 
EMS Environmental Management System 
EU European Union 
GPPS General-Purpose Polystyrene 
HDPE High-Density Polymers of Ethylene 
HIPS High Impact Polystyrene 
Hong Kong SAR Hong Kong Special Administration Region 
IIT Illinois Institute of Technology 
LDPE Low-Density Polymers of Ethylene 
PC Polycarbonates 
PET Polyethylene Terethalate 
PP Polypropylene 
PRD Pearl River Delta 
PS Polymers of Styrene 
PVC Polymers of Vinyl Chloride 
UV Ultra-Violet 
WPL Wofoo Plastics Limited 
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